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Jessica Bulman-Pozen* & David E. Pozen** 
Scholars and activists have long been interested in conscientious 
law-breaking as a means of dissent. The civil disobedient violates the 
law in a bid to highlight its illegitimacy and motivate reform. A less 
heralded form of social action, however, involves nearly the opposite 
approach. As a wide range of examples attest, dissenters may also seek 
to disrupt legal regimes through hyperbolic, literalistic, or otherwise 
unanticipated adherence to their formal rules. 
This Article asks how to make sense of these more paradoxical 
protests, involving not explicit law-breaking but rather extreme law-
following. We seek to identify, elucidate, and call attention to the 
phenomenon of uncivil obedience. After defining uncivil obedience 
and describing its basic varieties and mechanisms, we explore tools that 
have emerged to limit its use. We explain that private law has developed 
more robust defenses against uncivil obedience than has public law, 
especially in civil-law jurisdictions. We argue that the challenges 
uncivil obedience poses to public law values are as substantial as those 
posed by civil disobedience. And we suggest that uncivil obedience may 
be a particularly attractive tactic for ideologically conservative 
individuals and the contemporary Republican Party. For these reasons 
and others, the Article aims to show, uncivil obedience deserves much 
more of the sort of critical attention that has been afforded to civil 
disobedience. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In April 1993, a group of California motorists hit the road to 
challenge the fifty-five-miles-per-hour freeway speed limit. The motorists 
did not violate any laws, or even test any legal bounds. But their actions 
caused significant disruption and enraged people around them. What 
did they do? “[J]ust about the worst thing you can do to your fellow 
freeway drivers: They stayed within the speed limit.”1 To subvert the fifty-
five-miles-per-hour rule and encourage its repeal, the National Motorists 
Association members devised a peculiar form of protest: meticulous 
compliance with the very law they opposed. 
Scholars and activists have long been interested in conscientious and 
communicative breaches of law as an instrument of dissent. The civil 
disobedient violates a legal command in a bid to register opposition and 
motivate reform. Yet as the freeway protest underscores, people may also 
seek to disrupt an existing legal regime by adhering—in a hyperbolic, 
literalistic, or otherwise unanticipated manner—to its formal rules. 
This Article begins to theorize these more paradoxical challenges to 
legal authority. We seek to identify, define, and elucidate the phenom-
enon of uncivil obedience.2 In important respects, uncivil obedience is the 
mirror image of civil disobedience. On most accounts, civil disobedience 
consists of an open violation of law and a willingness to submit to 
                                                                                                                           
 1. Josh Meyer, Slowpokes Make Point at 55 M.P.H., L.A. Times (Apr. 26, 1993), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1993-04-26/local/me-27445_1_speed-limit (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). 
 2. See infra notes 59–60 and accompanying text (explaining “uncivil obedience” 
label). 
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punishment. Uncivil obedience inverts these terms. Instead of explicit 
law-breaking, it involves subversive law-following.3 If civil disobedience is 
unusually deferential to legal protocol, relative to ordinary unlawful con-
duct, uncivil obedience is unusually defiant of established social practice, 
relative to ordinary lawful conduct. And it carries no clear legal conse-
quences. As the California Highway Patrol spokesman said of the speed-
limit protesters, “If they’re going on the freeway at 55, there’s not much 
we can do to them.”4 
Uncivil obedience is a recurring feature of public and private law 
contestation. Unlike civil disobedience, however, it is an obscure feature, 
a neglected category.5 An appreciation of its workings, this Article aims to 
show, offers conceptual and practical rewards for scholars, protesters, 
and policymakers alike. Investigating this phenomenon can help us to 
think through not only relatively minor examples such as the speed-limit 
demonstration but also more significant institutional conflicts, ranging 
from Senate obstructionism to state anti-abortion measures to employee 
work-to-rule actions. Moreover, it can refract some light back on debates 
over civil disobedience. 
Part I sets the stage by reviewing the concept of civil disobedience. 
Part II introduces civil disobedience’s legalistic counterpart, uncivil obe-
dience. After developing a working definition, we explore a range of 
examples, variations, and complications. Part III considers how legal 
systems respond to uncivil obedience. Private law, we explain, is better 
equipped to curtail uncivil obedience than is public law, especially in 
civil-law jurisdictions. Regardless of whether uncivil obedience is a fre-
quent—or even a viable—practice in any given setting, this analysis 
illustrates that the topic warrants serious academic and policy considera-
tion. Part IV brings civil disobedience back into the picture to organize 
                                                                                                                           
 3. That is, it involves subversive modes of behaving in conformity with law. An impor-
tant terminological clarification: In saying that uncivil obedients “obey,” “follow,” or 
“comply with” the law, we do not mean to suggest that they necessarily or even normally 
conform their behavior to the law because that is what the law directs them to do. We thus 
use “obedience” and related terms in a looser sense than some jurisprudes would allow. 
See, e.g., Donald H. Regan, Reasons, Authority, and the Meaning of “Obey”: Further 
Thoughts on Raz and Obedience to Law, 3 Can. J.L. & Jurisprudence 3, 16 (1990) (“[A]n 
agent ‘obeys’ authority, in the strict sense, only if she regards the authority’s directives . . . 
as intrinsic reasons for action.”). 
 4. Tony Knight, Group to Protest Speed Limit by Driving 55 MPH, L.A. Daily News, 
Apr. 25, 1993, at N3. 
 5. The phrase “uncivil obedience” makes an appearance in several memoirs by 
former activists, see, e.g., A. Alan Borovoy, Uncivil Obedience: The Tactics and Tales of a 
Democratic Agitator 15 (1991) (“The approach I advocate is a form of uncivil obedience. 
By this, I mean we should obey the law but stick it to the government anyway.”); Jim 
Corbett, Goatwalking: A Guide to Wildland Living 98 (1991) (discussing “Uncivil 
Obedience, Disobedience, and Civil Initiative”), and in a smattering of academic articles. 
We are not aware of any work that has considered the phrase or the phenomenon, how-
ever labeled, in depth. 
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and inform critique. The basic dilemma that uncivil obedience poses for 
public law values, we argue, is no less substantial than the dilemma posed 
by civil disobedience. At the same time, uncivil obedience plays a distinct 
role within the operations of government that demands critical engage-
ment on its own terms. 
I. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 
Because civil disobedience is a touchstone for understanding uncivil 
obedience, we begin with a brief discussion of the former. Our aim in 
this discussion is not to break any new ground. This Part frames our 
inquiry into uncivil obedience by highlighting key aspects of civil disobe-
dience recognized in the literature, along with some attendant complica-
tions and controversies. 
A pared-down definition of civil disobedience, limited to elements 
that have attained near-universal agreement among theorists, might be 
the following: “a conscientious and communicative breach of law 
designed to demonstrate condemnation of a law or policy and to contrib-
ute to a change in that law or policy.”6 Beyond these elements, one might 
further require that the breach be nonviolent and undertaken with a 
willingness to accept the legal consequences. These narrowing features 
are disputed; for some, they characterize the phenomenon more pre-
cisely, while for others they smuggle a normative defense of civil disobe-
dience into a purportedly neutral definition.7 
                                                                                                                           
 6. Kimberley Brownlee, Civil Disobedience, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Dec. 20, 2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/civil-disobedience [hereinafter 
Brownlee, Civil Disobedience] (on file with the Columbia Law Review). We draw in partic-
ular in this discussion on the influential formulations of John Rawls, Joseph Raz, 
Kimberley Brownlee, and Hugo Bedau. See generally Kimberley Brownlee, Conscience 
and Conviction: The Case for Civil Disobedience 18 (2012) [hereinafter Brownlee, 
Conscience and Conviction] (“[C]ivil disobedience must include a deliberate breach of 
law taken on the basis of steadfast personal commitment in order to communicate [one’s] 
condemnation of a law or policy to a relevantly placed audience.”); John Rawls, A Theory 
of Justice 364 (1971) (defining civil disobedience as “a public, nonviolent, conscientious 
yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in 
the law or policies of the government”); Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law 263 (1979) 
(“Civil Disobedience is a politically motivated breach of law designed either to contribute 
directly to a change of a law or of a public policy or to express one’s protest against, and 
[dissociation] from, a law or a public policy.”); Hugo A. Bedau, On Civil Disobedience, 58 
J. Phil. 653, 661 (1961) [hereinafter Bedau, On Civil Disobedience] (“Anyone commits an 
act of civil disobedience if and only if he acts illegally, publicly, nonviolently, and 
conscientiously with the intent to frustrate (one of) the laws, policies, or decisions of his 
government.”). 
 7. Compare, e.g., Rawls, supra note 6, at 364–68 (defining civil disobedience 
narrowly), with Raz, supra note 6, at 269 (arguing features proposed “in an attempt to 
articulate and justify a doctrine of the permissible forms of civil disobedience” are “arbi-
trary restrictions”). 
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On all accounts, civil disobedience is marked by a breach of positive 
law. The civil disobedient does not simply speak out, march, or otherwise 
lawfully raise objections. Instead, she distinguishes her protest by violat-
ing an official legal norm. Even this seemingly straightforward propo-
sition gives rise to complications, two of which merit attention here. First, 
must the civil disobedient violate the same law she is protesting? Al-
though a few commentators have suggested limiting the category to such 
direct action,8 the weight of authority recognizes indirect civil disobedience 
as well.9 People may violate a law they do not oppose (such as a traffic or 
trespass law) in order to challenge another law or policy (such as military 
policy). Indeed, in many instances, civil disobedients will be able to reg-
ister their dissent only by violating a law or policy distinct from the one 
they are challenging.10 And the conceptual line between direct and indi-
rect civil disobedience can itself be a blurry one.11 
                                                                                                                           
 8. See, e.g., Abe Fortas, Concerning Dissent and Civil Disobedience 63 (1968) 
(“[T]he disobedience of laws which are not themselves the target of the protest . . . 
constitutes an act of rebellion, not merely of dissent.”). 
 9. See, e.g., Brownlee, Conscience and Conviction, supra note 6, at 19 (recognizing 
both subcategories of civil disobedience); Rawls, supra note 6, at 364–65 (same); Hannah 
Arendt, Civil Disobedience, in Crises of the Republic 49, 55–56 (1969) (same); Marshall 
Cohen, Civil Disobedience in a Constitutional Democracy, 10 Mass. Rev. 211, 225 (1969) 
(same). In Daniel Markovits’s terms, the civil disobedient may “disobey one law . . . in 
defiance of another” law or legal regime. Daniel Markovits, Democratic Disobedience, 114 
Yale L.J. 1897, 1936 n.85 (2005) (emphases added). 
 10. See H.A. Bedau, Civil Disobedience and Personal Responsibility for Injustice, in 
Civil Disobedience in Focus 49, 52 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1991) [hereinafter Bedau, 
Personal Responsibility] (noting “undeniable fact that some injustices are inaccessible to 
direct resistance by some who would protest them” (emphasis omitted)); see also Rawls, 
supra note 6, at 365 (“[I]f the government enacts a vague and harsh statute against 
treason, it would not be appropriate to commit treason as a way of objecting to it . . . . In 
other cases there is no way to violate the government’s policy directly, as when it concerns 
foreign affairs . . . .”). Some would also exclude from the category of civil disobedience 
breaches of law that target nongovernmental entities, see Raz, supra note 6, at 264 
(bracketing protests against “actions or policies of private agents (trade unions, banks, 
private universities, etc.)”), while others insist it is arbitrary to exclude such protests 
insofar as they necessarily challenge “the legal framework that accepts [the condemned] 
policies and practices as lawful,” Brownlee, Conscience and Conviction, supra note 6, at 19 
n.8; see also Kent Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and Morality 234 (1987) (“As long as it 
does not seriously threaten the legal order, disobedience to correct private injustice 
cannot be ruled out on principle.”); Michael Walzer, Civil Disobedience and Corporate 
Authority, in Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War, and Citizenship 24, 43 (1970) 
[hereinafter Walzer, Civil Disobedience] (describing type of civil disobedience that “takes 
place simultaneously in two different social arenas, the corporation and the state”). 
 11. For instance, is refusing to pay taxes to the extent that one expects them to 
benefit the military an act of direct or indirect civil disobedience regarding military policy? 
See Kimberley Brownlee, The Communicative Aspects of Civil Disobedience and Lawful 
Punishment, 1 Crim. L. & Phil. 179, 184 n.9 (2007) [hereinafter Brownlee, 
Communicative Aspects] (presenting this example). 
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A second complication arises in legal orders with multiple sources of 
law. In the United States, challenges to state policies are routinely framed 
as attempts to vindicate federal statutory or constitutional guarantees, 
which enjoy the status of “the supreme Law of the Land.”12 The iconic 
examples of civil disobedience in recent American history—actions taken 
by Martin Luther King, Jr., Rosa Parks, and many others as part of the 
civil rights movement—arose in response to state laws now understood to 
be incompatible with the federal Constitution. As Charles Black noted at 
the time, one might therefore deny that any law-breaking occurred, even 
without recourse to natural law arguments: “The fact that we are a fed-
eral union changes much that would be civil disobedience into a mere 
claim of legal right, asserted against what only seems to be law.”13 Does 
this mean that our paradigm cases of civil disobedience actually involved 
no disobedience? Theorists have largely resisted this conclusion on the 
logic that the civil disobedient is “not simply presenting a test case for a 
constitutional decision,” but also or instead seeks to communicate her 
condemnation to an extrajudicial audience and is “prepared to oppose” 
the condemned measure “even if it should be upheld.”14 
While breach of law is a necessary aspect of civil disobedience, so too 
is a constraining commitment to state authority. Civil disobedience is 
more preservative than revolutionary. It demonstrates respect for the le-
gal system as a whole even as it defies one piece of the system. In John 
Rawls’s formulation, civil disobedience “expresses disobedience to law 
within the limits of fidelity to law, although it is at the outer edge there-
of.”15 At the heart of most every conception of civil disobedience, then, is 
the paradox of law-breaking that is, at the same time, law-respecting. The 
law-respecting aspect of civil disobedience is indicated by several inter-
related features. 
As an initial matter, civil disobedience must be conscientious—it 
must be serious, sincere, and based on conviction.16 An unscrupulous or 
impulsive act does not merit the label. While the civil disobedient need 
not be correct in her judgments, she must have an earnest belief both 
                                                                                                                           
 12. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Arendt, supra note 9, at 53 (“[B]ecause of its 
dual system[,] American law, in distinction from other legal systems, has found a nonficti-
tious, visible place for that higher law on which in one form or another jurisprudence 
keeps insisting.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 13. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Problem of the Compatibility of Civil Disobedience with 
American Institutions of Government, 43 Tex. L. Rev. 492, 506 (1965). 
 14. Rawls, supra note 6, at 365. 
 15. Id. at 366; see also, e.g., Walzer, Civil Disobedience, supra note 10, at 24 (“A man 
breaks the law [when engaging in civil disobedience], but does so in ways which do not 
challenge the legitimacy of the legal or political systems.”). 
 16. See, e.g., Rawls, supra note 6, at 364 (invoking conscientiousness); Bedau, 
Personal Responsibility, supra note 10, at 51 (same); Kimberley Brownlee, Features of a 
Paradigm Case of Civil Disobedience, 10 Res Publica 337, 338 (2004) (same). 
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that the measure she is targeting ought to be changed and that the need 
for change is sufficiently weighty, as a matter of justice or morality,17 to 
require her to break the law. 
She must also communicate that sentiment to an audience. Her au-
dience will almost certainly include government officials, and it will likely 
include victims of the targeted law, other dissenters, or society as a whole. 
As Kimberley Brownlee observes, the civil disobedient typically has both 
backward-looking and forward-looking communicative aims. In express-
ing her “disavowal of, and dissociation from, the protested law or policy,” 
she simultaneously seeks “to draw attention to the reasons for the protest 
so as to persuade the relevant audience to accept [her] position.”18 
Because an open breach of law may itself be powerfully expressive, 
the communicative element of civil disobedience will often be satisfied by 
the very act of law-breaking. Canonical examples have transpired in plain 
view and with advance notice to authorities, and some theorists have 
ascribed definitional significance to these attributes.19 “[T]here is noth-
ing evasive about civil disobedience,” Michael Walzer asserts; “a public 
claim against the state is publicly acted out.”20 Yet contemporaneous 
openness and advance notice may not be strictly necessary. In some 
cases—for instance, the release of animals from research laboratories or 
the vandalizing of nuclear power plants—such publicity would furnish 
legal enforcers the opportunity to thwart the endeavor. In these cases, 
subsequent acknowledgement and explanation of the act may fulfill the 
                                                                                                                           
 17. Rawls maintains that civil disobedience must be guided and justified by funda-
mental principles of justice. A civil disobedient may not base her protest on morality or 
religion, let alone on self-interest (although these may coincide with and support her 
claims); instead, she must appeal to “the commonly shared conception of justice that 
underlies the political order” and locate her protest within the majority’s contemporary 
understanding of justice. Rawls, supra note 6, at 365; see also Cohen, supra note 9, at 212 
(stating principles invoked by civil disobedient “are principles that he takes to be generally 
acknowledged”). Against Rawls, many commentators contend that the civil disobedient 
may seek to alter or expand the majority’s conception of justice, rather than appeal to its 
existing conception, and that moral or religious principles can equally motivate her dis-
sent. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 10, at 230–35 (challenging narrowness of Rawls’s 
formulation); Peter Singer, Democracy and Disobedience 88–90 (1973) (same). 
 18. Brownlee, Conscience and Conviction, supra note 6, at 18; see also Rawls, supra 
note 6, at 366 (characterizing civil disobedience as “form of address”); Raz, supra note 6, 
at 264–65 (noting expressive character of civil disobedience). 
 19. See, e.g., Rawls, supra note 6, at 366 (“[Civil disobedience] is engaged in openly 
with fair notice; it is not covert or secretive.”); Bedau, On Civil Disobedience, supra note 6, 
at 655 (“Usually, though not always, it is essential to the purpose of the dissenter that both 
the public and the government should know what he intends to do.”); Cohen, supra note 
9, at 212 (“[I]t is essential that [the civil disobedient’s actions] be performed in public, or 
called to the public’s attention.”). 
 20. Michael Walzer, The Obligation to Disobey, in Obligations: Essays on 
Disobedience, War, and Citizenship 3, 20 (1970) [hereinafter Walzer, Obligation]. 
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requirement of communicativeness, along with many of the social values 
this requirement is thought to serve.21 
In breaking the law, furthermore, the civil disobedient must aim to 
advance a reform agenda of some sort.22 It is, in substantial part, this 
reformist intent that distinguishes civil disobedience from conscientious 
objection as each has been traditionally understood. The latter is “essen-
tially a private action by a person who wishes to avoid committing moral 
wrong by obeying a . . . morally bad law.”23 The conscientious objector 
wishes to opt out. The civil disobedient, in contrast, is more interested in 
changing the law to which she objects than in exempting herself from 
participation. 
While the core of civil disobedience therefore consists of a conscien-
tious, communicative breach of law undertaken with reformist intent, 
two additional criteria figure prominently—though not universally—in 
the literature. First, numerous theorists contend, the means of resistance 
must be nonviolent. Nonviolence, on these accounts, is not just a hall-
mark of morally legitimate civil disobedience but a definitional require-
ment insofar as it makes “civility” possible.24 Others respond that even if 
nonviolence is generally to be preferred, it is a category error to view any 
particular mode of conduct as a necessary aspect of civil disobedience.25 
                                                                                                                           
 21. See Brownlee, Conscience and Conviction, supra note 6, at 23 (“Disobedience 
carried out covertly in the first instance to ensure that the act is successful may nonetheless 
be open and communicative when followed by an acknowledgment of the act and the 
reasons for taking it.”); Raz, supra note 6, at 265 (“[O]nly the fact that an act of disobe-
dience occurred and . . . the nature of its motivation have to be made publicly known.”). 
 22. See, e.g., Brownlee, Communicative Aspects, supra note 11, at 180 (stating civil 
disobedient must convey not only criticism “but also her desire for . . . a lasting change in 
law or policy”). But cf. Raz, supra note 6, at 263–64 (arguing civil disobedience may be 
“designed either to contribute directly to a change of a law or of a public policy or to 
express one’s protest against, and [dissociation] from, a law or public policy,” but further 
noting all civil disobedience is designed “to have a political effect”). Although “[a]cts of 
civil disobedience often have focused and limited objectives,” Brownlee, Civil 
Disobedience, supra note 6, several commentators have recently called attention to 
variants that aspire to challenge political structures or stimulate democratic engagement 
more broadly. We discuss these variants infra notes 110, 253–257 and accompanying text. 
 23. Raz, supra note 6, at 264; see also Singer, supra note 17, at 93 (noting con-
scientious objection “is undertaken in order to avoid taking part in the policies to which 
one objects, rather than in order to change those policies”). But see Walzer, Obligation, 
supra note 20, at 12 (classifying conscientious objection as form of civil disobedience); 
Jeremy K. Kessler, The Administrative Origins of Modern Civil Liberties Law, 114 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1083, 1090 (2014) (arguing World War I activists and administrators conceived of 
conscientious objection “not as a right to opt out of the warfare state, but rather as a right 
to participate in . . . a particularistic manner”). 
 24. See, e.g., Arendt, supra note 9, at 76–77 (asserting nonviolence is “generally 
accepted necessary characteristic of civil disobedience”); Bedau, On Civil Disobedience, 
supra note 6, at 656 (“The pun on ‘civil’ is essential; only nonviolent acts thus can 
qualify.”). 
 25. See, e.g., Brownlee, Conscience and Conviction, supra note 6, at 21–23 
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A violent act, some writers further emphasize, may in certain cases pro-
duce less harm than a nonviolent act.26 Or the evil that the civil disobe-
dient is protesting may be so great as to justify some amount of force.27 
Second, classic accounts of civil disobedience envision the breach of 
law being paired with submission to punishment.28 Martin Luther King, 
Jr.’s Letter from Birmingham City Jail famously focuses on this feature: “One 
who breaks an unjust law must do it openly, lovingly . . . and with a 
willingness to accept the penalty.”29 The civil disobedient’s willingness to 
accept legal consequences evinces her commitment to the polis and 
humility before fellow citizens, notwithstanding her momentary turn 
away from the law. It is thus, for many theorists, a critical way of nego-
tiating the paradox of law-breaking that is nonetheless law-respecting.30 
                                                                                                                           
(contesting “presumed incivility of violence”); Walzer, Civil Disobedience, supra note 10, 
at 25 (arguing “insistence on the absolute nonviolence of civil disobedience is . . . a little 
disingenuous,” in light of violence and coercion risked by all legal disobedience); Howard 
Zinn, A Fallacy on Law and Order: That Civil Disobedience Must Be Absolutely 
Nonviolent, in Civil Disobedience and Violence 103, 111 (Jeffrie G. Murphy ed., 1971) 
(“[I]t would be foolish to rule out at the start, for all times and conditions, all of the vast 
range of possible tactics beyond strict nonviolence.”). 
 26. See Raz, supra note 6, at 267 (“[C]ertain non-violent acts, indeed some lawful 
acts, may well have much more severe consequences than many an act of violence: 
consider the possible effects of a strike by ambulance drivers.”); see also Brownlee, 
Conscience and Conviction, supra note 6, at 21–22 (“[F]ocusing attention on violence 
draws attention away from the presumptively more salient issue of harm.”). 
 27. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 10, at 244–65 (arguing violence may sometimes 
be justified). Theorists have advanced additional criteria for distinguishing justified from 
unjustified civil disobedience. See, e.g., Rawls, supra note 6, at 371–77 (proposing civil 
disobedience should be limited to instances of clear and substantial injustice, used as last 
resort, and involve coordinated action among minority groups). But see Raz, supra note 6, 
at 275 (arguing such conditions represent attempt to “routinize” civil disobedience and 
“make it a regular form of political action to which all have a right,” when civil 
disobedience’s “exceptional character lies precisely . . . in the fact that it is (in liberal 
states) one type of political action to which one has no right”). 
 28. As with nonviolence, however, some contend that willingness to accept punish-
ment is not a definitional component of civil disobedience but rather a morally significant 
consideration for evaluating its practice. See, e.g., Raz, supra note 6, at 265 (adopting this 
view). Others stress the insufficiency of willingness to accept punishment as a basis for 
legitimation. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 9, at 214 (“It is mindless to suppose that murder, 
rape or arson would be justified if only one were willing to pay the penalty . . . .”). 
 29. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham City Jail, in A Testament of 
Hope 289, 294 (James Melvin Washington ed., 1986) (emphases omitted); see also id. at 
291 (“[W]e would present our very bodies as a means of laying our case before the 
conscience of the local and national community.”). Drawing on King’s example, 
contemporary critics of Edward Snowden have insisted that his flight from prosecution 
disqualifies him from civil disobedient status. See Michael J. Glennon, Is Snowden Obliged 
to Accept Punishment?, Just Security (June 3, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://justsecurity.org/ 
11068/guest-post-snowden-obliged-accept-punishment (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (detailing and disputing this line of argument). 
 30. See, e.g., Rawls, supra note 6, at 366–67 (arguing “fidelity to law is expressed . . . 
by the willingness to accept the legal consequences of one’s conduct”); Bedau, Personal 
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II. UNCIVIL OBEDIENCE 
Certain acts of protest do not involve “disobedience” in the sense of 
a breach of law, and yet neither are they easily accommodated within 
familiar models of lawful dissent. Recall the speed-limit protesters dis-
cussed in the Introduction. They were not civil disobedients. By driving 
fifty-five miles per hour (without occupying the breakdown lane, ob-
structing emergency vehicles, or violating any other relevant directives31), 
they deliberately stayed within the limits of the law. And while abiding by 
the law is itself nothing special, the conspicuous law-abidingness of the 
motorists’ action was a striking feature; they displayed an extraordinary 
attentiveness to the rules on the books, as against common practice and 
widely shared sense of desirable practice. Demonstrations, boycotts, pick-
ets, and other traditional types of protest may conform to the law as well, 
but the manner in which they do so is not likewise an ironic or consti-
tutive aspect of their resistance. 
Canvassing other areas of law, we find many more examples of actors 
engaging in a practice that seems to be a looking-glass version of civil 
disobedience: challenging a legal or policy scheme by adhering, in me-
thodical yet unexpected ways, to its formal provisions. Like the speed-
limit protest, some of these examples involve hyperbolic compliance with 
authoritative commands. Employees with grievances occasionally use a 
tactic that has nearly the opposite character of walking out on the job. 
“Working to rule,” they do exactly what they are told to do, adhere 
exactly to safety protocols, or report to and depart from the premises 
exactly on time.32 After collective bargaining between American Airlines 
                                                                                                                           
Responsibility, supra note 10, at 51 (stating civil disobedience’s occurrence within 
framework of rule of law necessitates “willingness on the part of the disobedient to accept 
the legal consequences of his act”); Bernard E. Harcourt, Political Disobedience, in 
Occupy: Three Inquiries in Disobedience 45, 46–47 (2013) (“[Civil disobedience] respects 
the legal norm at the very moment of resistance, and places itself under the sanction of 
that norm. If it resists the legal sanction that it brings upon itself, in truth it is no longer 
engaged in civil disobedience.”). 
 31. The possible application of multiple laws to “uncivil” behaviors is a focus of infra 
Part III.A. 
 32. See, e.g., Local 702 Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 215 F.3d 11, 14 
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (considering work-to-rule action in which employees were “adhering 
strictly to all company safety and other rules; doing exactly and only what they were told; 
[and] reporting to work precisely on time” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Direct 
Action: Solidarity and Sabotage, in We Are Everywhere: The Irresistible Rise of Global 
Anticapitalism 456, 457 (Notes from Nowhere ed., 2003) (“The notion of the work-to-rule 
is brilliantly simple—workers follow every rule, no matter how foolish, inefficient, or ill-
advised. They break no laws, cause as much disruption as a strike, yet everyone still gets 
paid!”). William Simon has described work to rule as the practice of “bring[ing] an 
enterprise to a halt by refusing to cut the corners necessary for things to function 
smoothly” and cited it as a case of “scrupulous compliance with the law [that] is so bur-
densome and even disruptive that it occurs only as a form of protest.” William H. Simon, 
The Practice of Justice 90–91 (1998). 
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and its pilots failed in 2012, for instance, the pilots began to file inces-
sant—and technically mandatory—maintenance requests. Rather than 
violate company policies or industry regulations to make a point about 
their value to the airline, they complied in a rigid and highly disruptive 
manner.33 
Other examples involve maximalist uses of codified rights to “crash” 
or “flood” a system. In 1966, Columbia University sociologists Richard 
Cloward and Frances Fox Piven wrote a famous article in The Nation that 
called for “a massive drive to recruit the poor onto the welfare rolls” in 
order to “precipitate a profound financial and political crisis” that would 
lead to a replacement of welfare with “a guaranteed annual income and 
thus an end to poverty.”34 Cloward and Piven’s plan eschewed legal fraud 
or trickery. Instead, it sought to exploit the “vast discrepancy . . . between 
the benefits to which people are entitled under public welfare programs 
and the sums which they actually receive.”35 If millions of eligible poor 
people could be mobilized to claim their statutory due, Cloward and 
Piven thought, the welfare system would collapse, its moral and material 
inadequacies laid bare. 
Still other examples involve the actions of government officials, 
including their creation of new laws.36 In recent years, several states have 
                                                                                                                           
 33. As one commentator explained: 
If you ran your car like American Airlines has been running for the last two 
weeks[,] if your car was leaking oil on the drive, write it up. Windshield wipers 
streaking, write it up. Shocks squeaking, write it up. Car pulls slightly to the left, 
write it up . . . . A lot of systems in the morning sometimes just don’t come on 
line in the correct sequence. You’ll get a light or the thing won’t test so the fix is 
to power it down and then power it back up. Is a pilot authorized to do this[?] 
[N]o but we all used to do it so the flight could depart on time. Now if the same 
problem occurs guys are putting it in the log book and taking the delay. 
Terry Maxon, Another American Airlines Pilot Explains Why AA Is Having So Many 
Delays, Dall. Morning News: Aviation Biz Blog (Sept. 30, 2012, 6:22 PM), http:// 
aviationblog.dallasnews.com/2012/09/another-american-airlines-pilot-explains-why-aa-is-
having-so-many-delays.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 34. Frances Fox Piven & Richard Cloward, The Weight of the Poor: A Strategy to End 
Poverty, Nation (Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.thenation.com/article/weight-poor-strategy-
end-poverty [hereinafter Piven & Cloward, Weight of the Poor] (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (originally published May 2, 1966). 
 35. Id. Cloward and Piven argued that maximizing welfare rolls would strain the “big-
city Democratic coalition: the remaining white middle class, the white working-class ethnic 
groups and the growing minority poor.” Id. To preserve that coalition, and spurred by 
lobbying from mayors and governors rather than the poor themselves, “a national 
Democratic administration would be constrained to advance a federal solution to poverty 
that would override local welfare failures, local class and racial conflicts and local revenue 
dilemmas.” Id. Although never fully implemented, the Cloward–Piven proposal remains a 
canonical text for the welfare rights movement. See generally Frances Fox Piven & Richard 
Cloward, Poor People’s Movements 275–88 (1977) (discussing proposal). 
 36. We explore some of the distinctive complexities raised by this category of 
examples infra Part II.B.4. 
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enacted legislation mandating that all medication-induced abortions ad-
here strictly to a regimen approved (but not required) by the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) in 2000.37 Evidence-based medicine gener-
ated a less onerous alternative protocol after 2000, and the vast majority 
of abortion providers have not followed the FDA-approved regimen for 
more than a decade.38 Although the challenge to abortion rights is clear, 
proponents of this legislation feign obsequiousness to federal authority, 
insisting that they are merely hewing to the health and safety standards 
established by the U.S. government. 
Each of these examples of subversive legalism is a type of “uncivil 
obedience.” This Part first defines uncivil obedience and defends our 
choice of label in Part II.A, and then probes some nuances and compli-
cations in Part II.B. To better illustrate the phenomenon and to under-
score its potential significance, Part II.B also offers a variety of additional 
examples. 
A. A Definition 
Drawing on standard accounts of civil disobedience, we define 
uncivil obedience to consist of the following elements: 
1) Conscientiousness—a deliberate, normatively motivated act or 
coordinated set of acts; 
2) Communicativeness—that communicates criticism of a law or 
policy; 
3) Reformist intent—with a significant purpose of changing or 
disrupting that law or policy; 
4) Legality—in conformity with all applicable positive law; and 
5) Legal provocation—in a manner that calls attention to its own 
formal legality, while departing from prevailing expectations 
about how the law will be followed or applied. 
Uncivil obedience, as we conceive of it, is thus both a foil for and 
partial mirror of civil disobedience. It parallels the latter in its conscien-
tiousness, communicativeness, and reformist intent, even as it reverses 
the central choice to violate the law. And while each type of action is 
meant to provoke, civil disobedience does so through unvarnished law-
                                                                                                                           
 37. See generally Heather D. Boonstra, Medication Abortion Restrictions Burden 
Women and Providers—and Threaten U.S. Trend Toward Very Early Abortion, 16 
Guttmacher Pol’y Rev. 18, 21–22 (2013) (summarizing these laws); Guttmacher Inst., State 
Policies in Brief: Medication Abortion (2015), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/ 
spibs/spib_MA.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (same). 
 38. See Boonstra, supra note 37, at 19 (describing ways in which FDA-approved 
regimen has become “antiquated”); Stanley K. Henshaw & Lawrence B. Finer, The 
Accessibility of Abortion Services in the United States, 2001, 35 Persps. on Sexual & 
Reprod. Health 16, 20–21 & tbl.4 (2003) (finding eighty-three percent of medication 
abortions performed in 2001 used a third of FDA-approved mifepristone dose). 
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breaking, whereas uncivil obedience does so through unorthodox law-
following. 
Before developing these points, we stress that, while we set forth 
necessary and sufficient criteria in an effort to characterize uncivil obe-
dience as clearly as possible, we cannot eliminate hard questions about 
the specification of the various elements. As explained in Part I, scholars 
of civil disobedience continue to spar about not only normative questions 
but also definitional ones, ranging from the place of nonviolence to the 
status of indirect action to the significance of an individual’s willingness 
to suffer punishment. Comparable disagreements are to be expected for 
uncivil obedience. If the definition we offer generates further elabora-
tion and contestation, so much the better. 
Conscientiousness requires that the act be subjectively serious, calcu-
lated, and grounded in sincere conviction. It does not require that the 
act be morally attractive or guided by fundamental principles of justice. 
Nor does it require that the effort be devoid of self-interest—a condition 
even classic examples of civil disobedience could not meet. The bar to 
clear here is low.39 The conscientiousness criterion weeds out narrowly 
commercial or competitive behaviors (a lawsuit brought for pecuniary 
gain, a sports ploy) and instinctive or whimsical behaviors (a blurted-out 
remark, a mischievous improvisation) that lack entirely the depth of pur-
pose associated with civil disobedience. 
It follows that the same act can fall inside or outside the category of 
uncivil obedience depending on the actor’s motivations.40 If driven by 
little more than a desire for private benefit, work-to-rule protests of the 
sort noted above would not satisfy the conscientiousness criterion. In 
contrast, work-to-rule protests animated to any significant degree by a 
broader normative critique—for instance, about the relationship be-
tween management and labor or the distrust of workers implied by the 
rules themselves—may be said to be conscientious.41 The conscien-
tiousness criterion does not rule out instrumental behavior as such. 
Uncivil obedience is a tactic for challenging the prevailing order. But it 
must be a tactic that is rooted in genuine belief about right and wrong 
and, as we discuss below, that is deployed to achieve lasting reform. 
                                                                                                                           
 39. Cf. infra notes 233–236 and accompanying text (explaining why strength of 
conviction needed to inspire uncivil obedience is likely to be weaker on average than what 
is needed for civil disobedience). 
 40. For acts taken by groups, most of the individuals involved, or at least their 
leaders, must be properly motivated. Those members of the group who lack conscien-
tiousness (or reformist intent) may not themselves be uncivil obedients, even if their 
collaborators and the act itself so qualify. 
 41. We assume that most work-to-rule actions, like other labor protests, will involve a 
complicated and evolving mix of narrowly instrumental and broadly political motivations. 
As long as the latter set of motivations exerts substantial influence, we think it appropriate 
to characterize such actions as conscientious. 
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Communicativeness requires that the act convey disapproval of a law 
or policy. This message may be conveyed performatively, through the act 
itself, or it may be conveyed verbally, through commentary about the act. 
If a handful of protesters drove fifty-five miles per hour on the freeway 
one morning and never announced why, their behavior might elicit some 
honking but it would not register as a critique of the speed limit—and so 
would not satisfy the communicativeness criterion. If hundreds of motor-
ists drove fifty-five at the same time, their critical message might become 
sufficiently self-evident. If the motorists affixed explanatory stickers to 
their rear windows, the message would become more apparent still.42 
This criterion generally implies contemporaneous publicity as to an act 
of uncivil obedience’s occurrence and intended significance.43 
Communicativeness, however, does not necessarily require candor. If 
it is well understood that a certain act represents a conscientious effort to 
disrupt a law or policy, then the act may count as uncivil obedience even 
if the actor herself denies any disruptive ambition. What matters is the 
social meaning of her words and deeds, not the semantic content of her 
rationalizations.44 Employees who engage in work to rule and state legis-
lators who limit medication abortion may claim that they are “just” 
looking out for workplace safety or women’s health, but their actions may 
disclose a distinct critical agenda concerning labor relations or the availa-
bility of abortion. 
Reformist intent requires that the actor not only convey disapproval of 
some law or policy but also aspire to reshape it in an enduring manner, 
one that transcends her individual circumstances.45 In some instances, as 
in the speed-limit protest and the Cloward–Piven welfare proposal, the 
uncivil obedient may aspire to change the law or policy with which she is 
                                                                                                                           
 42. As this discussion reflects, uncivil obedience by private citizens may require 
coordination on a significant scale—not just to be effective but even to be intelligible. One 
civil disobedient may be able to prick the conscience of the community by lying down in 
the middle of a busy street. One would-be uncivil obedient achieves nothing by driving at 
the speed limit. 
 43. We say “generally” because, as with civil disobedience, certain forms of reasonably 
prompt ex post publicity may suffice where contemporaneous publicity would be exceed-
ingly costly or self-defeating. Supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 44. Social meaning refers to “the attitudes and commitments that are communicated 
by words or actions” in context, which may not correspond to “the words that are actually 
being used.” Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Big Government, 15 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 
147, 154 (1995). 
 45. Reformist intent will often follow from conscientiousness, but not always, as when 
the actor has not formulated any prescriptive agenda or when the change she seeks is 
limited to her own case. More broadly, many controversial uses of law will fail to satisfy one 
or more of the elements above. For instance, tax gamesmanship and “strategic lawsuits 
against public participation” (lawsuits brought to silence critics by burdening them with 
the cost of a legal defense) will generally not be uncivil obedience because they are not 
conscientiously pursued for the reform of law or policy. But cf. infra notes 66–67 and 
accompanying text (discussing unusual case of tax gamesmanship that met these criteria). 
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conspicuously complying. Following the civil disobedience literature, we 
will call this direct uncivil obedience. In other instances, as in the work-to-
rule and medication-abortion examples, she may utilize one law or policy 
to challenge another law or policy, just as a civil disobedient might utilize 
trespass laws (in her case, by violating them) to protest nuclear power. 
We will call this indirect uncivil obedience and will return to the direct–
indirect distinction below.46 
The reform that the uncivil obedient seeks may be more or less 
explicit. The National Motorists Association members who protested the 
fifty-five-miles-per-hour speed limit wanted Congress to repeal the 
relevant statute (a permanent conditional spending restriction enacted 
in 1974).47 As a second-best or substitute goal, however, uncivil obedients 
may aim to reshape the “law in action,”48 without necessarily revising the 
law on the books, so that the sociolegal environment better accom-
modates their beliefs. It would still be uncivil obedience if the freeway 
protesters addressed their complaint to the state police, rather than a leg-
islature, and asked for an unwritten practice of nonenforcement against 
drivers going under seventy. 
As a tactic for pursuing reform, uncivil obedience may be useful in a 
variety of ways, which are not independent of each other and may over-
lap in any given case. Most basically, uncivil obedience can enhance the 
salience of a regulation or highlight its objectionable nature. By adhering 
to the freeway speed limit, the National Motorists Association protesters 
sought to “‘demonstrate[] how ridiculous driving 55 is, and how frus-
trated drivers get at that speed.’”49 Uncivil obedience can also exert pres-
sure more directly by undermining the efficacy or efficiency of a par-
ticular law, policy, or institution. Through work to rule, employees make 
it exceedingly difficult for management to run a successful business; they 
suppress the initiative and discretion needed to translate any set of for-
mal directives into a productive, cooperative scheme. In many cases, 
uncivil obedience aims to raise the social as well as the private cost of 
                                                                                                                           
 46. See infra Part II.B.3; see also supra notes 8–11 and accompanying text (describ-
ing direct–indirect distinction in civil disobedience literature). 
 47. See Meyer, supra note 1 (“Their protest is aimed at getting Congress to repeal the 
federal speed limit law imposed during the Arab oil embargo in 1974 and to return such 
authority to the states.”); see also Marks v. Mobil Oil Corp., 562 F. Supp. 759, 771–72 (E.D. 
Pa. 1983) (summarizing legislative history behind 1974 measure). Congress did in fact 
repeal the national speed limit two years later, in 1995, following a decline in the price of 
crude oil. National Highway System Designation Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-59, § 205(d), 
109 Stat. 568, 577. 
 48. For the canonical exposition of the distinction between law in action (or the “real 
rules”) and law in books (or the “paper rules”), see Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law 
in Action, 44 Am. L. Rev. 12 (1910); see also Frederick Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed, 
91 Tex. L. Rev. 749, 750–51 nn.5–6 (2013) (collecting other classic Legal Realist treat-
ments of this distinction). 
 49. Meyer, supra note 1 (quoting protester Al Allen). 
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maintaining the condemned law or policy. By maximizing welfare rolls, 
the Cloward–Piven plan openly sought to “precipitate a profound finan-
cial and political crisis.”50 
Legality is the major point of divergence from civil disobedience. 
This criterion requires that authoritative directives be followed rather 
than flouted, obeyed rather than disobeyed. More specifically, it requires 
that the uncivil obedient reasonably and genuinely believe it to be clear 
that she is violating no positive law or regulation of an applicable juris-
diction.51 These laws and regulations may be public in nature, as in the 
case of a statute or a constitution, or they may be more private, as in the 
case of a contract or a code of conduct.52 We say “laws” and “regula-
tions,” plural, because the uncivil obedient’s conduct will often be 
governed by an array of legal norms. As we elaborate in Part III, the mere 
fact of scrupulous conformity with one targeted norm (for example, a 
speed limit) does not necessarily ensure conformity with other relevant 
norms (for example, an emergency vehicle right of way). Legality, as we 
are using it, requires that there be no evident law-breaking of any sort. 
Legality is a function of both the actor’s subjective understanding 
and the prevailing view of what counts as lawful in a given setting. It 
cannot always be ruled out that an official enforcer or adjudicator will 
ultimately deem an act of uncivil obedience to be proscribed—for 
example, on the view that it excessively frustrates the spirit or purpose of 
a statute—just as it cannot always be ruled out that a judge will ultimately 
deem an act of civil disobedience to be permitted.53 The critical thing is 
that, at the time the act is taken, it must not be apparent to the uncivil 
obedient or to informed observers that her behavior is proscribed. Mere 
evasion does not qualify. The uncivil obedient must believe that her 
behavior truly conforms to relevant legal norms, not just that she is 
unlikely to be caught or punished.54 By the same token, conduct taken to 
facilitate a test case, on the hope that a court will recognize a new legal 
theory or resolve a lingering legal uncertainty, does not qualify as uncivil 
obedience inasmuch as the decision to bring such a case reflects signif-
icant doubt about the conduct’s lawfulness. 
                                                                                                                           
 50. Piven & Cloward, Weight of the Poor, supra note 34. 
 51. Accordingly, it is not uncivil obedience—although it may be civil disobedience—
if a person violates local law X on the view that X is invalid because incompatible with a 
provision of “higher” positive law. 
 52. In defining legality to require conformity with such privately as well as publicly 
generated obligations, we align ourselves with those who define civil disobedience in 
similarly expansive terms. Supra note 10. 
 53. See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text (noting this feature of civil 
disobedience). 
 54. Evasive behavior may not qualify as uncivil obedience for additional reasons, such 
as a lack of communicativeness or reformist intent. 
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An important implication of the legality criterion is that the uncivil 
obedient need not evince any willingness to submit to punishment by the 
authorities, for no formal sanction is anticipated. Any number of 
informal sanctions may follow an episode of uncivil obedience.55 Motor-
ists who drive fifty-five on the freeway can expect to be honked at or 
tailgated.56 Employees who engage in work to rule may be ridiculed, 
harassed, or worse. But because the uncivil obedient must genuinely and 
reasonably believe that her actions violate no laws, she will not expect to 
be penalized through an official fine, forfeiture, prison sentence, or the 
like. 
Given the legal system’s broad prohibitions on premeditated vio-
lence, it further follows from the legality criterion that uncivil obedience 
will almost always have a nonviolent character. Whereas the nonviolence 
usually attending civil disobedience mitigates the breach of law, the 
nonviolence associated with uncivil obedience reflects the fact that no 
breach has occurred. 
Finally, legal provocation requires that the act, although believed to be 
lawful, strike others as jarring or subversive—and strike others as jarring 
or subversive at least in part because of its very attentiveness to law. In one 
sense, the National Motorists Association members behaved in an utterly 
unexceptional manner when they drove fifty-five on the freeway. They 
simply followed the rules as written. But as a matter of local practice, 
their decision to hew to the posted speed limit was highly unconven-
tional, outrageous even, which is why it attracted so much attention and 
functioned as protest. Uncivil obedience thus has a significant conven-
tional as well as intentional aspect. Identifying its existence requires some 
familiarity with (or inferences about) not only the actor’s motivations but 
also the norms of the sociolegal environment in which she is operating. 
We will have more to say in Part II.B about provocation. Here, we 
emphasize simply that the uncivil obedient’s use of an authoritative 
directive must itself provoke.57 Soapbox speakers and consumer boy-
                                                                                                                           
 55. See infra Part III.C (considering informal regulation of uncivil obedience). 
 56. See Mark A. Edwards, Law and the Parameters of Acceptable Deviance, 97 J. 
Crim. L. & Criminology 49, 58 (2006) (“[T]he unacceptably compliant driver might find 
himself subject to sanctions such as tailgating, horn-blowing, headlight-flashing, and 
obscene gestures . . . .”); see also Meyer, supra note 1 (describing angry responses by other 
drivers to National Motorists Association protest). As Mark Edwards observes more 
generally, while “[f]ormal institutions of enforcement are not well-equipped to punish 
normatively unacceptable legal behavior, because the acknowledged justification for their 
intervention—violation of formal law—is unavailable,” Edwards, supra, at 77, “[i]nformal 
social sanctions might be expected against behaviors that are formally compliant but 
normatively unacceptable,” id. at 58. 
 57. Although beyond the scope of this study, it would be possible to extend the idea 
of uncivil obedience to wholly nonlegal, unwritten norms, as in exaggerated compliance 
with a rule of etiquette. Cf. infra notes 247–249 and accompanying text (discussing James 
Scott’s related concept of “critiques within the hegemony”). 
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cotters deliver countless orations and give up countless products in ways 
that are conscientious, communicative, reform-minded, and law-abiding. 
Their efforts typically will not qualify as uncivil obedience, however, 
because there is nothing about their obedience to authority that distin-
guishes their intervention. They act legally but not legalistically.58 Uncivil 
obedience, in contrast, seeks to highlight, and exploit, the peculiar 
character of its compliance. Just as the civil disobedient flaunts her law-
breaking, the uncivil obedient flaunts her law-following. 
It is the provocative aspect of uncivil obedience that underwrites its 
“incivility.” The behaviors at issue defy widely held norms about how 
people in a given environment relate to the law, and in so doing pose a 
threat to social courtesy and order.59 Like civil disobedience, uncivil obe-
dience is a relative concept. Just as civil disobedience is notably more civil 
than ordinary law-breaking, uncivil obedience is notably less civil than 
ordinary law-following. Civil disobedience is civil in that it displays 
uncommon regard for law and decorum, considering that it partakes of 
illegality. Uncivil obedience is uncivil in that it displays uncommon disre-
gard for principles of custom and moderation, even as it clings to formal 
legality. The oxymoronic labels capture these internal tensions.60 
B. Refinements 
Uncivil obedience may therefore be defined as a conscientious, 
communicative, and reform-minded act that expresses criticism, ironi-
cally, through law-following rather than law-breaking. As with civil disobe-
dience, however, any attempt to unite such a wide range of behaviors 
under one heading raises classificatory complications. In this Part, we 
explore a few additional questions about the boundaries of uncivil obedi-
ence, and we offer more examples of the phenomenon to flesh out the 
account offered above. Again, our aim is not so much to provide an 
                                                                                                                           
 58. See Legalism Definition, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of English 
Language 1290 (3d ed. unabr. 1993) (defining “legalism” as “excessive reliance on legal 
principles and practices esp[ecially] as interpreted literally”). Most socially provocative 
behaviors that are lawful—from speaking in a loud voice to making outrageous claims to 
dressing like a chicken—are not provocative in the way they relate to law. Although inher-
ently fuzzy at the margins, the distinction we are drawing between legally provocative be-
havior and otherwise provocative behavior is no more (or less) problematic than the well-
established related distinction between legalistic behavior and otherwise lawful behavior. 
 59. Cf. Uncivil Definition, id. at 2485 (defining “uncivil” as, inter alia, “lacking in 
courtesy” or “not conducive to civic harmony and welfare”). 
 60. Although we believe the “uncivil obedience” label to be the most felicitous for 
the way it highlights the ironic character of these practices and the comparison with civil 
disobedience, cf. supra note 3 (explaining sense in which we use “obedience”), we do not 
mean for the label itself to do any critical work. Acts of incivility may be fully justified 
under certain circumstances. In what one assumes was an effort to isolate the positive 
connotations of “civil disobedience,” the speed-limit protesters discussed in the main text 
dubbed their action National Civil Obedience Day. Meyer, supra note 1. 
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exhaustive guide to uncivil obedience as it is to provide a useful guide—
and, in so doing, to put the subject on the intellectual map. 
1. Legal Provocation. — Legal provocation—the requirement that 
the act strike others as jarring or subversive in its attentiveness to law—is 
the most distinctive element of uncivil obedience as we have defined the 
concept. This element does much the same work for uncivil obedience as 
breach of law does for civil disobedience. It is law-breaking above all else 
that distinguishes civil disobedience from more conventional forms of 
protest; legal provocation is what sets uncivil obedience apart. Yet while 
law-breaking is generally taken to be a straightforward proposition in the 
civil disobedience literature,61 legal provocation admits of degrees and 
assumes quite different guises that are worth pulling apart. 
How does adherence to law ever manage to provoke? The superficial 
paradox dissolves as soon as one considers the informal social norms that 
shape expectations as to how any directive will be followed and applied. 
These norms can be breached even when the directive itself is not. Provo-
cation inheres in the gap between the official rules and the unofficial 
customs that coexist in a given area,62 or between the letter of the law 
and its perceived purpose or spirit, and in the attention that is called to 
this gap. Just as some types of law-breaking (jaywalking with no cars 
around, driving fifty-seven miles per hour on the freeway) may not 
register as unusual or uncooperative on account of this gap, some types 
of law-following can trigger the opposite reaction.63 
Legal provocation may be especially legible when the act of uncivil 
obedience departs not only from social norms and regulatory goals but 
also from the actor’s immediate interests. Americans by and large assume 
that motorists do not wish to drive fifty-five on the freeway and that 
employees do not wish to work robotically to orders. When these behav-
iors occur, it may therefore be all the more apparent that their law-
abidingness has a critical cast. Even when provocation does not entail 
such self-denial, however, it is always marked by the actor’s unusually 
                                                                                                                           
 61. See, e.g., Brownlee, Civil Disobedience, supra note 6 (describing civil disobe-
dience as “invariably illegal,” without further explication). The civil disobedient, it is as-
sumed, wants to be seen as violating an applicable positive law. While questions may arise 
as to whether her violation was justified by higher-law principles, there is typically no dis-
pute as to whether a prima facie breach occurred. 
 62. This “area” may be a physical domain, as in the case of a specific freeway or 
workplace, or it may be a regulatory domain, as in the case of a specific tax code or public 
benefits system. In either case, the uncivil obedient must defy practices or expectations 
that are widely followed or held among the community of persons bound by the law of the 
area. We mean for this formulation to be a bit loose. Just how widely followed or held a 
practice or expectation must be, and just how to mark the boundaries of a relevant area or 
community, are not in our view matters that can be specified ex ante with precision. 
 63. Cf. Edwards, supra note 56, at 57 (observing existence of behaviors that are 
formally illegal but within socially constructed “parameters of acceptable deviance,” as well 
as behaviors that are formally legal but outside of these parameters). 
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intensive, ostentatious, and self-conscious engagement with the technical 
legality of her protest. 
Legal provocation tends to take one of several basic forms. The 
simplest cases involve a legal command addressed to members of the 
public. In some (relatively rare) instances, the very fact of compliance 
with the command may be provocative. The speed-limit protest is an 
example. The National Motorists Association members drove just as fast 
as the law allows. Their action nonetheless grabbed headlines because, 
on the Southern California freeways, the “law-as-behaved” diverged so 
dramatically from the “law-on-the-books” that abiding by the latter was 
perceived as a deviant act.64 
In other cases, the degree of compliance with an official directive 
can provoke. Work to rule exploits this possibility. Managers assume that 
employees will be responsive to orders and will respect the terms of their 
contracts—but not exactly and exclusively, not woodenly. Full compliance 
is so inconsistent with workplace norms and management desires that it 
is experienced as a kind of nonviolent sabotage, the equivalent of 
“striking on the job.”65 
Unusual methods of compliance, as well as workarounds that avoid 
the obligation to comply, can similarly provoke.66 Angela and David 
Boyter’s protest against the federal marriage tax “penalty” offers a 
colorful illustration. Realizing that their tax burden would be signifi-
cantly lower if they filed as single people, and further realizing that the 
tax code provides that marital status for a given year depends only on 
whether one is married on December 31, the Boyters began to divorce 
each December and remarry each January.67 Spending the money they 
saved on a lavish trip, the Boyters used their annual vacation-divorces to 
ridicule and raise awareness of the marriage penalty. With the apparent 
aim of tightening rather than loosening federal regulation, satirist 
Stephen Colbert recently mocked the Federal Election Commission rules 
prohibiting political action committee (PAC) “coordination” with elec-
                                                                                                                           
 64. See id. at 50 (explaining that in addition to “well-recognized gap between law-on-
the-books, or formal law, and law-as-enforced,” there “is a parallel gap between law-on-the-
books and law-as-behaved”); see also supra note 48 and accompanying text (noting distinc-
tion between “real” and “paper” rules). 
 65. See, e.g., Jeremy Brecher, Strike! 251 (revised ed. 2014) (explaining work slow-
downs and work-to-rule actions were common labor tactics in 1930s and were variously 
called “the conscious withdrawal of efficiency,” “striking on the job,” or “sabotage”). 
 66. In the constitutional context, Mark Tushnet defines workarounds as situations 
where, “[f]inding some constitutional text obstructing our ability to reach a desired goal, 
we work around that text using other texts—and do so without (obviously) distorting the 
tools we use.” Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Workarounds, 87 Tex. L. Rev. 1499, 1503 
(2009). 
 67. See Michael J. Graetz, The Decline (and Fall?) of the Income Tax 35–39 (1997) 
(discussing Boyters’ protest and responses it elicited); Jill Elaine Hasday, Family Law 
Reimagined 54 (2014) (same). 
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toral candidates by creating a Super PAC, turning over the reins to Jon 
Stewart so that Colbert could run for President, and going on Stewart’s 
television show to “not coordinate” with him about how the Super PAC’s 
money would be spent.68 More colorful still is the story of the female 
philosopher who protested an establishment’s “no pants” rule for women 
by dropping her trousers and demanding to be seated.69 
Less ingenious examples of subversive compliance appear in the 
news with some regularity. Many taxpayers and toll-payers, for instance, 
have communicated criticism by paying the required sum in low-denom-
ination coins.70 Whereas work to rule provokes by fixating on the precise 
terms of an instruction, this tactic takes advantage of the fact that official 
directives invariably fail to address various details and contingencies. 
Under certain conditions, the resulting silences can be filled in antago-
nistic yet lawful ways.71 
While the core case of uncivil obedience involves hyperbolic compli-
ance with laws that tell people what they must do, legal provocation can 
also occur through unorthodox uses of rights and privileges that give 
people the option to do certain things. Here our label is less felicitous: It 
                                                                                                                           
 68. Recognizing that federal election law permitted him to express his wishes for the 
Super PAC as long as he communicated them publicly rather than privately, Colbert came 
prepared with a cardboard television set and broadcast his wishes from inside the set, all 
while sitting at Stewart’s desk. Katla McGlynn, Jon Stewart, Stephen Colbert Expose More 
Super PAC Loopholes Without “Coordinating,” Huffington Post (Jan. 18, 2012, 9:01 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/18/jon-stewart-stephen-colbert-expose-super-
pac-loopholes_n_1212670.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated Feb. 
23, 2012, 7:44 AM). To hammer home the point, Colbert’s Super PAC, originally named 
“Americans for a Better Tomorrow, Tomorrow,” was unofficially renamed “The Definitely 
Not Coordinating with Stephen Colbert Super PAC” after Colbert put Stewart in charge. 
Under New Management!, Colbert Super PAC, http://www.colbertsuperpac.com/archive/ 
011212a.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Mar. 16, 2015). 
 69. Jane O’Grady, Elizabeth Anscombe, Guardian (Jan. 10, 2001), http://www.the 
guardian.com/news/2001/jan/11/guardianobituaries.highereducation (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). Although some might prefer to limit the concept of uncivil 
obedience to protests against government laws or policies, on our account at least some 
private codes of conduct may be targeted as well. Supra notes 51–52 and accompanying 
text. 
 70. See, e.g., John Del Signore, Drivers Protest Verrazano Bridge Toll with Pennies, 
Gothamist (May 19, 2009, 3:10 PM), http://gothamist.com/2009/05/19/drivers_protest_ 
verrazano_bridge_to.php (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“[F]ed up Staten 
Islanders disrupted traffic at the Verrazano Bridge toll booths for about 20 minutes 
yesterday by slowly paying the $10 toll in pennies to protest an imminent increase.”); see 
also Jim Shea, It’s Time to Eliminate the Dreadful Penny, Hartford Courant, Mar. 5, 2014, 
at D1 (“As for the penny being an instrument of protest, let’s face it, the paying of taxes or 
fines in pennies lacks originality to the point of now being lame.”). 
 71. Depending on the jurisdiction and on the manner in which these behaviors are 
executed, some variants may run afoul of separate legal prohibitions, such as a specific cap 
on the number of pennies that may be used in any given transaction or a general ban on 
disorderly conduct, and therefore would not qualify as uncivil obedience. See infra Part 
III.A (explicating this point). 
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may sound odd to speak of “obedience” with regard to a right or privi-
lege that is framed in discretionary terms. But there is nothing odd about 
envisioning a gap between what is technically permitted by such laws and 
what prevailing customs or understandings would allow. When dissenters 
target this gap, they too may provoke through their attentiveness to, and 
perverse respect for, legal language. The Cloward–Piven plan, which 
aimed to take down the welfare system by achieving full participation of 
eligible individuals, provides an example.72 
Cloward and Piven’s basic insight—that the welfare system might be 
overwhelmed by a strategic shift in the number or type of legal claims 
made on it, even when those claims were entirely valid—has broader 
application.73 In recent years, for instance, civil-rights activists have pro-
posed organizing thousands of criminal defendants to refuse to plea 
bargain and insist upon trials. Forgoing pleas would likely disserve the 
immediate interests of not only prosecutors and judges but also many de-
fendants themselves. The broader goal, however, is to “crash the justice 
system.”74 “If everyone charged with crimes suddenly exercised his 
constitutional rights,” Michelle Alexander argues, “there would not be 
enough judges, lawyers or prison cells to deal with the ensuing tsunami 
of litigation,” and the resulting chaos would force a sharp decline in 
criminal cases and an end to mass incarceration.75 
Although such uncivil obedience has not occurred on a national 
scale,76 Alexander’s premise is an old one,77 and variants of her proposal 
have been put into practice. Public defender offices have engaged in 
“general strikes,” insisting on trials for all of their clients in order to 
                                                                                                                           
 72. See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text (summarizing Cloward–Piven 
plan). We will soon turn to a prominent set of contemporary examples, involving use of 
the quorum call, hold, and other procedural privileges by minority-party senators. See 
infra notes 96–102 and accompanying text. 
 73. This is the case across as well as within jurisdictions. For an example of 
administrative flooding from the United Kingdom, see Mark Thomas, So Many Causes, So 
Little Time, Guardian (Oct. 11, 2006, 8:10 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/ 
2006/oct/12/houseofcommons.comment (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(describing wave of “mass lone protests,” as well as author’s own serial protests, in 
response to U.K. law requiring permit for all demonstrations near Houses of Parliament). 
 74. Michelle Alexander, Op-Ed, Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y. Times 
(Mar. 10, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/opinion/sunday/go-to-trial-crash-
the-justice-system.html?_r=0 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 75. Id.; cf. Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 
1089 (2013) (exploring possible refinements to and extensions of Alexander’s proposal, 
focused on minor misdemeanors). 
 76. See generally Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, The Prisoners’ (Plea Bargain) 
Dilemma, 1 J. Legal Analysis 737 (2009) (discussing collective-action problems faced by 
defendants). 
 77. See, e.g., Henry T. Lummus, The Trial Judge 46 (1937) (“If all . . . defendants 
should combine to refuse to plead guilty, and should dare to hold out, they could break 
down the administration of justice in any state in the Union.”). 
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change the way judges and prosecutors apply criminal laws.78 In Los 
Angeles, for example, public defenders at one point reportedly refused 
to enter guilty pleas for individuals charged with prostitution until 
sentencing policies for the offense were amended.79 
2. Government Actors. — Legal provocation is not limited to actions 
taken by lay citizens or their lawyers. Government officials and entities 
can engage in it too. One virtue of the concept of uncivil obedience, in 
our view, is that it helps illuminate methodological continuities across 
public and private dissent. 
We will consider the special case of subnational legislation shortly.80 
But the most easily recognizable form of legal provocation in govern-
ment may be the maximalist enforcement tactics that have been adopted 
by certain chief executives. Just as full compliance is not common or 
desirable in many areas of law, neither is full enforcement.81 Without a 
specific legislative instruction to do so, there is little reason to expect that 
an executive will implement any given authority or prosecute any given 
prohibition to a T, at the inevitable cost of depleting resources available 
for other responsibilities. Full enforcement, consequently, may be seen as 
upending rather than perfecting the existing sociolegal order. 
For example, when Theodore Roosevelt became head of the New 
York Police Commission in the 1890s, he began to strictly enforce laws 
that required saloons to close on Sundays. Previously, the laws had been 
rarely and selectively enforced, according to Roosevelt, “to blackmail and 
browbeat the saloon keepers who were not the slaves of Tammany Hall.”82 
Roosevelt contended that his approach might precipitate repeal of the 
Sunday closing law and furthermore “prevent the Legislature from 
passing laws which are not meant to be enforced.”83 He thus instantiated 
                                                                                                                           
 78. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 Yale 
L.J. 1179, 1249 (1975) (describing general strikes as “most spectacular form of bargaining 
leverage that a public defender office can exert”). 
 79. See id. at 1251 (recounting this episode). 
 80. See infra Part II.B.4. 
 81. Cf. Edwards, supra note 56, at 80 n.137 (“Either full enforcement or compliance 
would likely bring any functioning society to a crashing halt.”). 
 82. Mr. Roosevelt Answers, N.Y. Times (July 17, 1895), http://query.nytimes.com/ 
mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9C04E2DA103DE433A25754C1A9619C94649ED7CF (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review). 
 83. Id. See generally Doris Kearns Goodwin, The Bully Pulpit 209–10 (2013) (discuss-
ing Roosevelt’s strict enforcement policy). As a journalist observed at the time: 
[Roosevelt’s] reasoning had all the simplicity of originality. He was appointed to 
enforce the laws as they appeared on the statute books. He enforced them. That 
was originality; it rarely had been done before . . . . When prominent citizens 
and influential newspapers protested, he answered: “I am placed here to enforce 
the law as I find it. I shall enforce it. If you don’t like the law, repeal it.” 
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President Ulysses Grant’s dictum: “I know no method to secure the re-
peal of bad or obnoxious laws so effective as their stringent execution.”84 
Executive nonenforcement of the law, in contrast, will not as a 
general matter qualify as legal provocation. In the American constitu-
tional system, a policy of presidential nonenforcement runs straight into 
the Take Care Clause and its requirement “that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.”85 Some believe that nonenforcement can be justified when 
the law at issue is clearly unconstitutional or in other circumstances.86 
But if a policy of nonenforcement provokes, it is not because it flaunts its 
formal legality but rather because it flirts so brazenly with illegality. Jury 
nullification is similar in this regard, at least in the many jurisdictions 
where its lawfulness is denied by judges and other authorities.87 (In those 
jurisdictions where the jury’s power to nullify is recognized in the consti-
tution or otherwise clearly established,88 an explicit and reform-minded 
scheme of nullification—such as Paul Butler’s proposal to remedy the 
racial impact of our drug laws89—could count as uncivil obedience.) 
                                                                                                                           
Ray Stannard Baker, Theodore Roosevelt: A Character Sketch, McClure’s Mag., Nov. 1898, 
at 23, 30, available at http://www.unz.org/Pub/McClures-1898nov-00023 (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). 
 84. Ulysses S. Grant, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1869), available at http:// 
avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/grant1.asp (on file with the Columbia Law Review). More 
recently, critics charged that the Administrator of President Reagan’s Environmental 
Protection Agency was interpreting the Clean Air Act in a “deliberately rigid fashion” so as 
to “prod Congress into reworking” the Act. Philip Shabecoff, Mrs. Gorsuch as a Crusading 
Tiger? Critics Wonder Why, N.Y. Times (Dec. 26, 1982), http://www.nytimes.com/1982/ 
12/26/weekinreview/mrs-gorsuch-as-a-crusading-tiger-critics-wonder-why.html (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review); see also id. (“Mrs. Gorsuch said the imposition of sanctions would be 
‘an unhealthy, regressive step . . . . But I always said I will fulfill my oath of office . . . .’”). 
 85. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. 
 86. See, e.g., Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 
18 Op. O.L.C. 199 (1994) (defending this general proposition and suggesting factors that 
ought to bear on nonenforcement decisions). 
 87. See generally Andrew J. Parmenter, Note, Nullifying the Jury: “The Judicial 
Oligarchy” Declares War on Jury Nullification, 46 Washburn L.J. 379, 402–10 (2007) 
(cataloging efforts by U.S. judges to prevent and delegitimize jury nullification). Jury 
nullification occurs when a jury acquits a defendant it believes to be guilty “either because 
the jury wants to send a message about some social issue that is larger than the case itself 
or because the result dictated by law is contrary to the jury’s sense of justice, morality, or 
fairness.” Black’s Law Dictionary 989 (10th ed. 2014). In cases where the jurors’ reasoning, 
including their possible dissatisfaction with the law, remains opaque to the outside world, 
nullification would further fail the communicativeness requirement of uncivil obedience. 
 88. See Parmenter, supra note 87, at 391 (listing Georgia, Indiana, and Maryland as 
having such constitutional provisions). 
 89. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal 
Justice System, 105 Yale L.J. 677, 680 (1995) (proposing jury nullification as means to sub-
vert racial oppression in criminal justice system and stimulate “implementation of certain 
noncriminal ways of addressing antisocial conduct”). 
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While nonenforcement usually will not provoke in the necessary 
manner, practices that are similar in effect, but different in their legal 
posture, may do so. Consider the case of “big waiver.” In recent years, the 
executive branch has seized on broad waiver provisions in federal statutes 
to dramatically alter the regulatory landscape.90 The No Child Left 
Behind Act of 2001, for instance, authorizes the Secretary of Education 
to “waive any statutory or regulatory requirement” of the Act, with 
limited exceptions.91 The Obama Administration has used this authority 
to grant more than forty states waivers from the Act’s onerous require-
ments—and, in so doing, has required this supermajority of states to 
conform to its vision of sound educational policy.92 Frustrated by 
Congress’s failure to amend No Child Left Behind, the executive has 
effected “nearly wholesale administrative revision” of the statute, all pur-
suant to the express terms of the statute.93 
Judicial application of the law is unlikely to qualify as uncivil obedi-
ence for a distinct set of reasons. In contemporary American practice, 
judges in particular are expected to attend carefully to the letter of the 
law.94 Even when they construe a directive in a literalistic manner, it will 
therefore rarely come across as an ironic or inflammatory intervention; it 
is more likely to be seen as ordinary judicial fare. Judges are also believed 
by many to be authoritative interpreters of legal texts, so that their 
                                                                                                                           
 90. See generally David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 
Colum. L. Rev. 265, 267 (2013) (explaining, under “big waiver,” executive agencies claim 
statutory authority to decide whether policies adopted by Congress should be dispensed 
with or replaced). 
 91. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 9401(a), 115 Stat. 1425, 
1972 (2002) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 7861(a) (2012)). 
 92. See U.S. Dep’t of Educ., ESEA Flexibility, http://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/ 
guid/esea-flexibility/index.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last modified Feb. 
25, 2015) (indicating forty-three states have been granted waivers). 
 93. Barron & Rakoff, supra note 90, at 268. In the White House’s own words, because 
No Child Left Behind was “stand[ing] in the way” of state progress and Congress would 
not amend the law, the “Administration moved forward to offer states flexibility within the 
law—as authorized by provisions in the law itself.” White House, Reforming No Child Left 
Behind, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/education/k-12/reforming-no-child-left-behind 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Mar. 5, 2015). As a presidential 
candidate, Mitt Romney pledged that he would dismantle the Affordable Care Act, 
lawfully, in a similar manner, although critics pointed out that only certain provisions of 
the Act were subject to waiver. See Julie Rovner, Can Mitt Romney Really Repeal 
Obamacare?, NPR (Oct. 30, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/10/30/163929221 
/can-romney-really-repeal-obamacare (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (quoting 
Romney as saying, “On day one of my administration, I’ll direct the secretary of Health 
and Human Services to grant a waiver from Obamacare to all 50 states”). 
 94. Cf. Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative 
History by the Rules, 122 Yale L.J. 70, 90 (2012) (explaining, in United States today, even 
self-identified purposivist interpreters always “begin with text”); Andrew Tutt, Fifty Shades 
of Textualism, 29 J.L. & Pol. 309, 309 (2014) (“‘We are all Textualists now’ has become 
such a popular refrain [among American commentators] it borders on cliché.”). 
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rulings are seen as elaborating the underlying law rather than changing 
or challenging it in some reformist fashion. While we can imagine hypo-
thetical examples of judges communicating a reformist intent through 
subversive attention to legal language (for instance, a judge sentencing at 
the very top of the guidelines range in order to protest draconian crim-
inal penalties95), and while our categories might be extended to embrace 
more judicial behavior, we are skeptical about the prevalence of judicial 
uncivil obedience as we have defined the concept. 
Finally, it bears mention that legal provocation may occur within, 
and not just by, institutions of government. We can see this vividly in the 
modern U.S. Senate. In recent years, minority-party senators have relied 
on a host of procedural privileges to undermine measures that have 
already become law or are on course to doing so. These senators have 
demanded that the entire text of lengthy bills be read aloud on the 
Senate floor.96 They have made “seemingly endless quorum calls and 
motions to reconsider previous votes.”97 They have used the filibuster in a 
routine manner, rather than in its traditional and, in the view of many, 
intended capacity as “the tool of last resort.”98 They have likewise used 
“holds” to stymie nominations and bills on an unprecedented scale.99 
Together with allies in the House of Representatives, several of them 
have deployed still more unorthodox maneuvers in a campaign to 
defund “Obamacare.”100 Although their criticisms are pitched in the 
language of conscience and crisis and their tactics defy longstanding con-
                                                                                                                           
 95. The inverse has happened: In a 2013 case, for example, Judge John Gleeson cited 
his “fundamental policy disagreement” with certain “excessively severe” drug-offense sen-
tencing guidelines in exercising his legal authority to impose a lighter sentence. United 
States v. Diaz, No. 11-821, 2013 WL 322243, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2013). Bracing as Judge 
Gleeson’s arguments are, there is nothing particularly provocative as a legal matter about a 
judge’s utilization of an authority, clearly recognized in Supreme Court doctrine, to 
downward-depart from the guidelines based on policy disagreement. 
 96. See Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Republicans Threaten Health Care Read-a-Thon, 
Newsday (Dec. 18, 2009, 1:43 PM), http://www.newsday.com/business/republicans-
threaten-health-care-read-a-thon-1.1660956 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting 
“senators usually waive” their right to have such bills read aloud on floor). 
 97. Niels Lesniewski, Reid, Obama Call for Senate Rule Changes to Curb Filibusters, 
CQ Today (Oct. 28, 2010, 4:39 PM), http://www.cq.com/doc/news-3756760?7&print=true 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 98. Walter J. Oleszek, Congressional Procedure and the Policy Process 304 (9th ed. 
2014). 
 99. See id. at 257 (observing holds “are a more prominent feature of today’s Senate” 
and quoting one senator as lamenting that holds “have come into a form of reverence 
which was never to be”). The hold is an informal device through which individual senators 
or groups of senators, whose identities may be withheld from the public, inform party 
leaders that they do not want a particular measure to be taken up on the floor. Id. at 256. 
 100. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Mike McIntire, A Federal Budget Crisis Months in the 
Planning, N.Y. Times (Oct. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/06/us/a-federal-
budget-crisis-months-in-the-planning.html?pagewanted=all (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (reviewing this campaign). 
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ventions,101 the Senators who engage in these behaviors have emphasized 
the formal legality of their obstructionism. They have waged their cam-
paign to undermine the majority agenda not as law-breakers but as legal 
mavens, devotees and defenders of the procedural rulebook. 
3. Direct, Indirect, and Comprehensive Variants. — Of course, minority-
party senators have not been using procedural privileges in novel ways to 
challenge those privileges themselves. Rather, they are engaging in what 
we have called indirect uncivil obedience.102 On a micro level, these 
senators have turned to legalism to challenge specific laws such as 
Obamacare. On a macro level, they have fastened on the rules of pro-
cedure as a means to subvert the other party’s entire political program. 
The direct version of uncivil obedience can be an especially elegant 
mode of advocacy. Adherence to law is leveraged to challenge the very 
law that is being followed. By sticking to the speed limit, the National 
Motorists Association members enacted their critique of it. The argu-
ments they offered were largely superfluous; the deed spoke for itself. 
The Cloward–Piven plan and Roosevelt’s enforcement of Sunday saloon 
laws were not quite so self-explanatory, but they too sought to catalyze 
reform simply by demonstrating what the laws on the books, if taken 
seriously, were capable of. 
A somewhat more complicated example of direct uncivil obedience 
is the Great American Boycott of 2006, during which more than a million 
people took to the streets demanding reform of U.S. immigration laws.103 
Responding most immediately to a House bill targeting undocumented 
aliens, protesters skipped work to show what the economy would look 
like without their labor (hence another name for the event: “A Day 
Without Immigrants”). Meat processing plants, vineyards, and farms were 
                                                                                                                           
 101. See David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 Yale L.J. 2, 39–
46 (2014) [hereinafter Pozen, Self-Help] (discussing these tactics and pressure they have 
placed on separation-of-powers conventions). Conceivably, a President could retaliate 
against Congress through obstructionist uncivil obedience of her own, as by vetoing every 
bill that crosses her desk until Congress changes some preexisting law or policy. 
 102. See supra notes 8–11 and accompanying text (explaining civil disobedience is 
widely understood to include direct and indirect variants); supra notes 45–46 and accom-
panying text (extending this distinction to uncivil obedience). In late 2013, minority-party 
senators’ continual use of the filibuster precipitated filibuster reform, unintentionally 
generating the sort of change that direct uncivil obedience seeks. See Jeremy W. Peters, In 
Landmark Vote, Senate Limits Use of the Filibuster, N.Y. Times (Nov. 21, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/22/us/politics/reid-sets-in-motion-steps-to-limit-use-of-
filibuster.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (explaining Senate Democrats voted 
to end use of filibuster for executive branch nominees and non-Supreme-Court judicial 
branch nominees). 
 103. See generally Michael Cabanatuan et al., A Million Say: Let Us All Stay/Historic 
Day: Across the Nation, a Rallying Call for Immigrants, S.F. Gate (May 2, 2006, 4:00 AM), 
http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/a-million-say-let-us-all-stay-historic-day-2519475.php 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing this protest as “nation’s largest 
coordinated demonstration since the war in Vietnam”). 
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forced to close for the day.104 By following the laws that bar them from 
employment, undocumented immigrants sought to demonstrate the 
laws’ intolerable implications.105 
Indirect uncivil obedience is almost certainly more common than 
direct uncivil obedience. The indirect uncivil obedient has greater de-
grees of freedom. She may make her point by conspicuously applying or 
adhering to any number of laws or policies that relate to the object of her 
condemnation, not just the condemned law or policy itself. Under work 
to rule, for instance, employees may hyper-comply with dozens of safety 
rules, contract terms, or industry regulations in the effort to reform the 
employment relationship. 
Although it is useful and intuitive to distinguish these two types of 
uncivil obedience, “direct” and “indirect” are best understood as reflect-
ing ranges along a continuum rather than a sharp dichotomy—just as 
with civil disobedience.106 Moreover, depending on how broadly or nar-
rowly one defines the law or policy that is being challenged, the same act 
of uncivil obedience may be described as more or less direct or indirect. 
Consider the recurring proposals for criminal defendants to refuse to 
plea bargain.107 The defendants involved would not, of course, be exer-
cising their constitutional trial rights in order to undermine those rights. 
The point is to undermine a cluster of laws and policies contributing to 
mass incarceration and racial injustice, evils that may seem remote from 
the Sixth Amendment. Yet if we were to characterize the object of reform 
at a higher level of generality—as, say, the American criminal justice sys-
tem—then these schemes begin to look more direct. 
Some episodes of uncivil obedience may be especially hard to place 
on the direct–indirect continuum not because the fit between means and 
                                                                                                                           
 104. See, e.g., Anita Hamilton, A Day Without Immigrants: Making a Statement, 
Time (May 1, 2006), http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1189899,00 
.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing protest’s economic impacts). 
 105. This performance of law-following, however, was itself an admission of systematic 
law-breaking. Undocumented workers were not truly complying with laws prohibiting their 
employment, or they would not have held jobs in the first place. It is necessary to isolate 
the one-day protest as the relevant time period, then, to appreciate its character as direct 
uncivil obedience. 
 106. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (noting potential blurriness of this 
distinction in civil disobedience context). We speculate that extreme indirectness is more 
likely to occur with civil disobedience than with uncivil obedience. The idea that law-
breaking can be an expressive, reformist tactic is fairly well understood. The idea of law-
following as such a tactic is less familiar. For those who seek to protest a certain law or 
policy by assiduously adhering to a distant law or policy, there is an added risk that the 
novelty of their approach will distract from, rather than amplify, their critical message. 
Lying down in the middle of traffic (unlawfully) and driving fifty-five miles per hour on 
the freeway (lawfully) are both extremely indirect means to protest a war. Only the latter 
tactic, however, seems not just attenuated but incoherent, implausible. 
 107. See supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text (discussing these proposals). 
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ends is so loose, but because they do not have any specific law or policy as 
their intended target. Most uncivil obedience, like most civil disobedi-
ence, has relatively “focused and limited objectives.”108 Certain cases, 
however, reflect a more diffuse ambition. Their aim is to challenge an 
entire mode of governance, political structure, or similarly capacious 
construct. 
On one reading, the obstructionist tactics of recent Senate minor-
ities fit this description. The Republican senators who leaned so heavily 
on the filibuster, the hold, the quorum call, and the like arguably were 
not out to derail any particular Democratic initiative as much as to repu-
diate the entire worldview for which the Democratic Party has come to 
stand.109 It is understandable that so many different tools of resistance 
would be enlisted in this campaign, as the campaign itself is so broad and 
encompassing. The systematic resort to legalistic obstructionism, within 
this context, seems better understood as a comprehensive program of 
uncivil obedience than as a series of discrete dissents.110 
4. Federalism: Lawmaking as Dissent. — The examples of uncivil 
obedience we have discussed so far exploit laws or policies that are al-
ready on the books. In some cases, however, we might also conceptualize 
the promulgation of new laws as uncivil obedience vis-à-vis a superior 
legal authority. This is a necessarily indirect form of uncivil obedience—
the legislation that is drafted will not be a challenge to itself but to some 
other law or policy. It is also a form that falls at the outer bounds of 
uncivil obedience and puts pressure on the definition offered above. 
                                                                                                                           
 108. Brownlee, Civil Disobedience, supra note 6. 
 109. See, e.g., David Fontana & Donald Braman, Judicial Backlash or Just Backlash? 
Evidence from a National Experiment, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 731, 747 n.53 (2012) (“The 
hierarchical-individualist worldview tends to be associated with the Republican Party and 
with those self-identifying as ‘conservative’; the egalitarian-communitarian worldview with 
the Democratic Party and with those self-identifying as ‘liberal.’” (citing Dan M. Kahan, 
Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in Acquaintance-Rape 
Cases, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 729, 784–85 & fig.7 (2010))). 
 110. Comprehensive uncivil obedience of this sort can be contrasted with the 
phenomenon that Bernard Harcourt calls “political disobedience.” Harcourt, supra note 
30, at 47. Responding to the Occupy Wall Street movement, Harcourt recently proposed 
this term to capture a species of disobedience that resists not just a condemned law or 
policy but “the very way in which we are governed.” Id. Political disobedience rejects “the 
structure of partisan politics, the demand for policy reforms, the call for party iden-
tification . . . . It turns its back on the political institutions and actors who govern us.” Id. 
 We find it difficult to envision uncivil obedience operating on such a model, if for no 
other reason than its painstaking concern for legal detail. Uncivil obedience’s strategic 
adherence to and reliance on the formal legal system implies that its rejection of existing 
political structures will never be quite so profound or so radical. Political disobedience 
“refuses to play the game.” Id. at 59. Uncivil obedience, even on a comprehensive scale, 
plays it with extreme dexterity. 
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In the United States, federalism is the most fecund source of legis-
lative uncivil obedience.111 While traditional accounts cast the states and 
the federal government as separate sovereigns, recent work has empha-
sized that the two occupy largely overlapping and intertwined policy-
making spaces.112 States generate national policy together with the 
federal government, and they frequently push back against the vision of 
national policy articulated by the federal government.113 Occasionally 
they do so through overt resistance, engaging in something analogous to 
civil disobedience.114 But they may also find uncivil obedience to be a 
powerful tool: States not infrequently adopt measures that trumpet their 
technical consistency with federal law while at a deeper level subverting 
it. 
States may, for example, enact laws that expressly incorporate feder-
al law or policy in order to challenge a related body of federal law or 
policy, thereby disrupting its operation locally if not also nationally. 
Recall the medication-abortion example from the introduction to this 
Part.115 Arizona, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Texas have each 
passed laws requiring that abortions performed using the drug combi-
nation Mifeprex adhere strictly to a protocol specified by the FDA more 
than a decade ago.116 The FDA protocol is not itself binding—the FDA 
generally anticipates and welcomes evidence-based departures from on-
label use of approved drugs—and in the years since it was adopted, prac-
titioners have widely shifted to an alternative regimen that involves lower 
                                                                                                                           
 111. The horizontal separation of powers across the branches of the federal 
government is much less fecund in this regard. Although it is possible to imagine Congress 
responding to a disagreeable Supreme Court ruling by passing new legislation that techni-
cally comports with the terms of the ruling but is widely understood as an effort to subvert 
its substance, actual cases of such legislative uncivil obedience appear to be rare at best. 
 112. E.g., Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: Toward the Protection of 
Fundamental Rights (2009); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 
1077 (2014); Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism 
All the Way Down, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (2010); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: 
How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (2007); 
Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 
Mich. L. Rev. 567 (2008). 
 113. See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process to 
Administration and Politics: The Afterlife of American Federalism, 123 Yale L.J. 1920 
(2014). 
 114. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 
Yale L.J. 1256, 1278–80 (2009) (arguing certain state responses to USA PATRIOT Act were 
“akin to civil disobedience”). 
 115. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text. 
 116. See Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, Oklahoma’s Abortion Battle Goes National, Am. 
Prospect (Oct. 30, 2013), http://prospect.org/article/oklahomas-abortion-battle-goes-
national (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing these five state laws as “part of 
the larger cascade of abortion restrictions that have swept the country in the past three 
years”). 
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doses of the drug, fewer visits to the doctor, and a greater period of 
availability.117 Certain state legislatures have, nonetheless, elevated the 
FDA protocol to the status of a legal requirement. Despite the impli-
cations for abortion access protected by the federal Constitution, these 
legislatures contend that they are ensuring abortion is safe for women by 
mandating compliance with federal health and safety standards.118 
States have similarly incorporated federal law into restrictive immi-
gration measures. Arizona’s controversial S.B. 1070, for instance, hewed 
closely to federal immigration statutes.119 Among other things, S.B. 1070 
made failure to comply with federal alien-registration requirements a 
state misdemeanor; authorized officers to make warrantless arrests of 
individuals they believed to be removable under federal law; and 
required officers to verify with the federal government the immigration 
status of individuals stopped or arrested and reasonably believed to be 
unlawfully present.120 State sponsors were not shy about presenting S.B. 
1070 as a challenge to the federal government. And yet they insisted that 
they were adhering to federal law, properly understood, and that their 
grievance lay with the federal executive branch’s lack of enforcement.121 
On what legal basis, they asked, could they be barred from adopting a 
law that “mirrors” the terms of federal law, often word for word?122 Like 
the states in the Mifeprex example, Arizona took a federal policy that 
leaves ample space for discretion (in this case by government enforcers 
rather than private actors) and challenged the policy by demanding strict 
adherence to it as a matter of state law. 
States may also engage in a subtler legislative variant of uncivil obe-
dience by imposing regulations that purport to be focused on discrete 
state responsibilities even as they affect the implementation of federal 
                                                                                                                           
 117. Boonstra, supra note 37, at 18–21. 
 118. See, e.g., id. at 21 (“These restrictions are proffered, although exclusively by 
abortion opponents, in the purported interest of protecting women’s health and safety. 
According to antiabortion activists, undergoing an abortion using a protocol other than 
that approved by the FDA . . . is a ‘prescription for disaster.’”). 
 119. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 14–15, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 
(2012) (No. 11-182), 2012 WL 416748 (“Throughout the legislative process . . . , S.B. 1070 
was revised to clarify and reinforce its express adoption of federal immigration standards, 
and the necessity that it be enforced in conformity with those standards.”). 
 120. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2497–98 (describing S.B. 1070). 
 121. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of 
Powers, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 459, 490–91 (2012) (explaining Arizona’s contention “that the 
federal executive is betraying Congress by underenforcing the federal immigration laws”). 
 122. This argument against preemption became known as the “mirror-image theory.” 
See Margaret Hu, Reverse-Commandeering, 46 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 535, 539 n.7 (2012). 
The theory’s basic claim, in the words of its architect, is that “[s]tate governments possess 
the authority to criminalize particular conduct concerning illegal immigration, provided 
that they do so in a way that mirrors the terms of federal law.” Kris W. Kobach, Reinforcing 
the Rule of Law: What States Can and Should Do to Reduce Illegal Immigration, 22 Geo. 
Immigr. L.J. 459, 475 (2008). 
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law. For instance, state legislatures and agencies have recently targeted 
the federally paid “navigators” who help individuals sign up for health 
insurance under Obamacare. Many Republican-controlled states require 
that navigators undergo background checks and restrict them from 
offering advice about the features of particular health plans.123 In con-
trast to more overtly oppositional efforts to thwart Obamacare, propo-
nents of these measures stress their consistency with states’ established 
role in regulating the insurance industry.124 They contend that such 
measures are necessary to protect privacy and safeguard consumers, and 
they trade on traditional understandings of separate state and federal 
spheres—arguing that consumer protection is a state responsibility in our 
constitutional system—even as they exploit the overlap of state and 
federal spheres to undermine federal policy.125 
While we believe each of these examples can be analyzed as uncivil 
obedience, they are difficult cases. Most importantly, they might be dis-
missed as law-evasion on the view that their state sponsors are—and 
appreciate that they are—violating federal mandates, just in shrewd ways 
                                                                                                                           
 123. See Katherine T. Vukadin, Obamacare Interrupted: Obstructive Federalism and 
the Consumer Information Blockade 26–29 (July 27, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2472594 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(cataloging tactics used to burden navigators); Nicholas Kusnetz, Obamacare’s Hidden 
Battle: Insurance Agents Push State Regulation of Guides to New Marketplaces, Ctr. for 
Pub. Integrity (Aug. 9, 2013, 5:00 AM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2013/08/09/ 
13144/obamacares-hidden-battle-insurance-agents-push-state-regulation-guides-new (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review) (“At least sixteen states have passed navigator laws since 
2012 . . . .”). 
 124. See, e.g., Kusnetz, supra note 123 (quoting numerous state sponsors who stress 
“[i]nsurance has long been the realm of the states” and who “maintain that these laws 
simply establish state oversight and ensure that consumers will be protected from unscru-
pulous or uninformed navigators”). 
 125. In a similar fashion, state legislatures have challenged women’s exercise of 
abortion rights by enacting TRAP (Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers) laws that 
impose onerous licensing requirements on abortion facilities. States mandate specific 
physical dimensions for procedure rooms, hallways, and janitors’ closets; require hands-
free sinks and complex ventilation systems; and impose design standards for parking lots 
and covered entrances. See generally Rachel Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, TRAP Laws 
Gain Political Traction While Abortion Clinics—and the Women They Serve—Pay the 
Price, Guttmacher Pol’y Rev., Spring 2013, at 7 (summarizing and criticizing this trend). 
These laws are justified by proponents as health and safety regulations of the sort the 
Supreme Court has upheld, see, e.g., Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997) (per 
curiam) (upholding state law requiring that abortions be performed by licensed physi-
cians), even though the requirements imposed on abortion providers are significantly 
more exacting than those imposed on other medical facilities and the laws are widely 
understood to undermine and signal opposition to—without directly flouting—the 
constitutional right to abortion. See, e.g., Editorial, Virginia’s Abortion Assault Claims a 
Victim, Wash. Post (Apr. 26, 2013), http://wapo.st/183RdOT (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (characterizing Virginia’s TRAP law as anti-abortion “ideological crusade 
masquerading as concern for public health”). 
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that complicate detection or sanction.126 This objection is clearest, per-
haps, with respect to the state abortion measures. U.S. Supreme Court 
doctrine provides that regulations with the purpose or effect of placing 
substantial obstacles in the path of women seeking abortions are uncon-
stitutional.127 As several federal courts have recognized, the above-
mentioned laws seem designed to curtail abortion rights.128 And the 
Supreme Court invalidated most of the challenged provisions of 
Arizona’s S.B. 1070 on preemption grounds, finding that the provisions 
were inconsistent with federal law notwithstanding their textual mimicry 
thereof.129 
Yet dismissing these examples as mere attempts at evasion may be 
too easy; it fails to capture the legal bravado of their approach as well as 
at least some of their proponents’ self-understanding. Uncivil obedience, 
recall, does not lose its status as such solely because the behavior in ques-
tion is ultimately deemed unlawful, just as civil disobedience does not 
lose its status as such solely because the behavior is ultimately deemed 
lawful.130 The critical question is whether, at the time the act is taken 
(here, at the time the state law is passed), those responsible for the act 
genuinely and reasonably believe it accords with all positive law. This is a 
close question in each of the examples presented above, especially given 
that we are dealing with collective agents that may lack any shared under-
standing of the law. But it seems plausible that many, if not all, of the 
responsible state legislators believed themselves to be acting in conform-
ity with federal law, even as they conscientiously sought to challenge a 
particular piece of it, on account of the care they took to model their 
measures on traditional state regulations or federal government texts. 
Through their unusual attention to legal detail, these lawmakers have 
been disrupting and defying federal legal policy from a posture of 
obedience. 
                                                                                                                           
 126. Cf. supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text (explaining evasion cannot 
constitute uncivil obedience). 
 127. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877–78 (1992) (joint 
opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.). 
 128. At this writing, Oklahoma’s medication-abortion law has been enjoined, while 
Ohio’s, North Dakota’s, and Texas’s have been upheld and a challenge to Arizona’s is 
pending. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 
583, 605 (5th Cir. 2014); Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region v. DeWine, 696 F.3d 490, 
516–18 (6th Cir. 2012); MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Burdick, 855 N.W.2d 31, 32 (N.D. 2014); 
Cline v. Okla. Coal. for Reprod. Justice, 313 P.3d 253, 262 (Okla. 2013); see also Planned 
Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 918 (9th Cir. 2014) (instructing district 
court to preliminarily enjoin Arizona’s law). The Fifth Circuit recently upheld Texas’s 
TRAP law. See Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs., 748 F.3d at 590–600 
(upholding admitting privileges requirement). 
 129. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). We return to the Arizona case 
infra notes 191–200 and accompanying text. 
 130. See supra notes 12–14, 51–54 and accompanying text (explaining these points). 
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III. CAPACITATING AND CONSTRAINING UNCIVIL OBEDIENCE 
Having defined uncivil obedience and limned its basic mechanisms 
and variants, we now broaden the lens to explore regulatory and jurispru-
dential implications. This Part considers the circumstances under which 
laws prove more or less susceptible to uncivil obedience, as well as some 
of the legal responses that its practice elicits. As the discussion so far has 
detailed, uncivil obedience manages to provoke through and within the 
law by exploiting gaps between the letter of legal directives and the 
customs or purposes associated with them. By attending to these predi-
cates, it becomes easier to see how the availability and efficacy of uncivil 
obedience may be conditioned by the surrounding doctrinal, institu-
tional, and cultural context. 
Several variables offer regulatory leverage. Here, we focus on 
whether a given directive assumes the form of a standard or a rule, and 
on whether and how a jurisdiction employs doctrines such as abuse of 
right and preemption. Private law, we explain, has developed more ro-
bust doctrines for disciplining uncivil obedience than has public law. We 
also consider the role of decentralized dynamics such as group “knitted-
ness,” extralegal sanctions, and the prevalence of positivism and 
formalism versus alternative understandings of law. We do not take up 
the issue of when legislators, bureaucrats, and other officials will seek to 
curtail uncivil obedience. Although it will often be intuitive why they 
might wish to do so, the motivations of these actors are too diverse and 
contingent to treat in a general fashion. For purposes of this discussion, 
one need only accept that at least some officials will want to curtail 
uncivil obedience at least some of the time. 
A. Rules and Standards 
In the legal literature on rules versus standards, a rule is generally 
taken to be a directive that “binds a decisionmaker to respond in a deter-
minate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts.”131 Rules are 
precise. They constrain the discretion of enforcers and interpreters 
through crisp ex ante instructions. “The speed limit is fifty-five miles per 
hour” is a classic rule. A standard, in contrast, “tends to collapse 
decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background 
principle or policy to a fact situation.”132 Standards are imprecise. They 
leave much of their content to be worked out by enforcers and inter-
preters on a case-by-case basis. “Drive at a reasonable speed” is a classic 
                                                                                                                           
 131. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices 
of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 58 (1992). 
 132. Id. 
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standard.133 Although rules and standards do not reflect sharply deline-
ated categories so much as ranges along “a continuum of greater or 
lesser ‘ruleness,’”134 the basic distinction between the two is useful and 
ubiquitous. 
Uncivil obedience thrives on rules. Rules are by nature both over- 
and under-inclusive. In the pursuit of clarity and certainty, they invariably 
“produce arbitrariness and errors in particular cases” that come within 
their ambit but do not fit well with the reasons for establishing the 
rule.135 The rigidity of rules often means that they can be implemented in 
ways that are consistent with their terms—and therefore presumptively 
lawful—yet insensitive to their underlying purposes and presuppositions 
or to the customs of compliance and enforcement that have developed in 
a given context. If the one law that governs driving on the freeway is 
“Speed Limit 55,” then driving fifty-five miles per hour will always and 
unquestionably be legal (and driving fifty-six will always be illegal), no 
matter how deviant or disruptive any case is perceived to be. Uncivil 
obedience trades on this possibility of defying norms through legal 
exactitude. 
Standards contain built-in safeguards against such manipulation, 
insofar as they “incorporate [their underlying] norms directly”136 and 
allow enforcers and adjudicators to consider a wider range of facts and 
factors. A law that says “Drive at a reasonable speed” does not similarly 
immunize all motorists traveling fifty-five miles per hour from a finding 
of illegality. Any driving that comes across as bizarre or inflammatory is at 
risk of being construed as unreasonable. 
One way to limit the incidence of uncivil obedience, then, is for 
authorities to employ standards instead of rules (or, more precisely, to 
employ directives that are more standard-like and less rule-like). Con-
versely, one way for activists to take advantage of uncivil obedience is to 
identify rules that by their plain terms insulate certain “incivilities”—
abnormal, antisocial, expressive behaviors—from official sanction. If 
employees are asked to carry out their duties in a “timely and efficient 
manner” rather than to follow a detailed list of instructions, then they 
                                                                                                                           
 133. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 Va. L. Rev. 
1, 16 (2011) (using similar speed-limit examples to illustrate rules–standards distinction); 
Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557, 560 
(1993) (same); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavior Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. 
Standards Revisited, 79 Or. L. Rev. 23, 23 (2000) (same). 
 134. Sullivan, supra note 131, at 58 n.231 (citing Margaret Jane Radin, Presumptive 
Positivism and Trivial Cases, 14 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 823, 828–32 (1991)); see also 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 
Colum. L. Rev. 1, 49 (1997) (“[A]s is well recognized, ‘rules’ and ‘standards’ do not so 
much define a dichotomy as reflect ranges along a continuum.”). 
 135. Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 Calif. L. Rev. 953, 992 (1995). 
 136. Dodson, supra note 133, at 17. 
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will have little prospect of engaging in work to rule.137 If the tax code 
determined marital status through a totality-of-the-circumstances test 
rather than a December 31 snapshot, then the Boyters would have been 
blocked from carrying out their divorce-and-remarry scheme.138 If 
senators’ option to use read-a-thons and holds were tied to an explicit 
requirement of “necessity,” “exceptional circumstances,” or the like, then 
critics would have an easier time casting repeat users as lawbreakers 
(whether or not the requirement could ever be enforced in court).139 In 
some cases, the switch from a rule to a standard may go further and elim-
inate the substantive basis for uncivil obedience. If Congress had told 
freeway motorists to drive at a safe speed rather than at fifty-five miles per 
hour or less, then the National Motorists Association presumably never 
would have staged its protest.140 
The turn to standards can undermine uncivil obedience at the level 
of legitimacy as well as legality, not only by increasing the protester’s odds 
of punishment but also by foregrounding the subversive aspect of her 
behavior. Standards moralize the practice of compliance. “Rather than 
applying a rule by rote, citizens must ask themselves, for example, wheth-
er they are treating one another fairly, whether they are acting in good 
faith, whether they are taking due care, whether they are behaving 
reasonably, and the like.”141 The very framing of these questions invites 
normative deliberation142 and suggests the appeal of established custom. 
Importantly, the standard that forecloses uncivil obedience need not 
be adopted in lieu of a rule, but may be adopted in addition to a rule. In 
some cases, that is, practices may be governed by both a rule and a stan-
dard143—often, a standard that applies to a wider swath of behavior than 
                                                                                                                           
 137. See supra notes 32–33, 65 and accompanying text (explaining work to rule); cf. 
David Luban, Misplaced Fidelity, 90 Tex. L. Rev. 673, 688 (2012) (book review) (observing 
work to rule is effective “because in the real world we expect people to make the innu-
merable minor adjustments that rules cannot capture”). In this sense, the use of the word 
“rule” in the label “work to rule” is entirely appropriate. 
 138. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (describing Boyters’ protest against 
marriage tax penalty). 
 139. See supra notes 96–102 and accompanying text (considering systematic Senate 
obstructionism as form of uncivil obedience). 
 140. See supra notes 1–4, 47–48 and accompanying text (discussing this protest). 
 141. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional 
Virtues of Fog, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1214, 1217 (2010). 
 142. See generally id. at 1219–31 (arguing relatively opaque and moralistic idiom of 
standards induces deliberation). 
 143. Cf. Eric A. Posner, Deference to the Executive in the United States After 
September 11: Congress, the Courts, and the Office of Legal Counsel, 35 Harv. J.L. & Pub. 
Pol’y 213, 220 (2012) (“The legal landscape is a complex mix of rules and standards, 
which often overlap. Drivers must obey both traffic rules like the speed limit and traffic 
standards like laws against reckless driving and tort norms against negligent driving.”). On 
the potential role of “abuse of right” as a super-standard proscribing incivility, see infra 
Part III.B.1. 
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the rule—and the standard may provide a backstop against certain forms 
of rule-conforming incivility. This is most likely to occur when the stan-
dard targets disruptive or pretextual activity. For instance, if the relevant 
rule instructs motorists to pay posted tolls, a would-be uncivil obedient 
who pays in pennies with the intent of obstructing traffic might, in some 
jurisdictions, be vulnerable to a charge of disorderly conduct or public 
nuisance.144 (A large group of penny-payers may be especially vulnerable, 
given the likely correlation between the protest’s scale and the level of 
disruption.) At a significant potential cost to legal certainty and civil lib-
erties,145 broadly framed prohibitions of this sort can effectively reduce 
the overinclusiveness of permissive rules and the underinclusiveness of 
restrictive rules in regulating unanticipated, uncooperative behaviors. 
If the specter of uncivil obedience can push lawmakers to frame 
directives as standards, so too may it push interpreters and implementers 
to construe rules in more standard-like terms. A formal revision to the 
governing law is not always necessary. Through “rule-avoidance strat-
egies” such as the creation of ad hoc exceptions, resort to reasonableness 
qualifications, and broad forms of purposive analysis, interpreters and 
implementers may be able to functionally convert a seemingly stringent 
rule into a more open-ended standard.146 In this vein, for example, some 
work-to-rule campaigns have been deemed inconsistent with the employ-
ment contracts to which they strictly adhered (and thus tantamount to 
unprotected partial strikes).147 And one federal appellate panel suggested 
                                                                                                                           
 144. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.74(2) (West 2009) (defining public nuisance to 
include intentionally “interfer[ing] with” or “obstruct[ing]” “any public highway or right-
of-way”); Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-102(1)(b)(iv) (LexisNexis 2013 & Supp. 2014) (defining 
disorderly conduct to include “obstruct[ing] vehicular or pedestrian traffic” with “inten[t] 
to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm”). Other jurisdictions, in contrast, 
limit the offenses of disorderly conduct and public nuisance to a distinct set of 
enumerated behaviors or to the creation of hazardous conditions. See, e.g., Tex. Penal 
Code Ann. § 42.01 (West 2013 & Supp. 2014) (restricting definition of “[d]isorderly 
[c]onduct” to enumerated behaviors); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 125.062–.063 
(West 2011) (limiting “public nuisance” to “continuously or regularly associat[ing] in 
gang activities” or habitually using particular location “for engaging in gang activity”). In a 
much-publicized 2011 incident, a Utah man who paid a disputed bill in pennies was cited 
for disorderly conduct—although reportedly for dumping thousands of coins over the 
counter and floor rather than for using pennies per se. See Eoin O’Carroll, 2,500 Pennies: 
Is It Legal to Pay a Bill in Pennies?, CSMonitor.com (June 6, 2011, 1:01 PM), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/2011/0606/2-500-pennies-Is-it-legal-to-pay-a-bill-in-
pennies (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 145. Just consider the potential costs to personal freedom and public discourse of 
maintaining an open-ended (though not unconstitutionally vague) prohibition on disor-
derly conduct. 
 146. See Frederick Schauer, The Convergence of Rules and Standards, 2003 N.Z. L. 
Rev. 303, 312–15 [hereinafter Schauer, Convergence] (cataloging “rule-avoidance strat-
egies”). 
 147. See, e.g., Lenox Educ. Ass’n v. Labor Relations Comm’n, 471 N.E.2d 81, 82–83 
(Mass. 1984) (holding “concerted refusal by public school teachers to perform services 
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that the Boyters’ divorces might not be recognized under the tax code 
because they were “shams.”148 Consistent with Frederick Schauer’s “con-
vergence hypothesis,” the desire to avert uncivil obedience thus provides 
an additional basis for predicting the evolution of rules into standards in 
the face of legalistic behavior.149 What begins as uncivil obedience ex ante 
may emerge from adjudication as law-breaking ex post. 
In some cases, it is unnecessary to shift to a standard, through any 
means, to foreclose uncivil obedience. A diametrically opposed response 
is for lawmakers to counter instances of uncivil obedience with still more 
specific rules. To deal with the problem of protesters who pay their taxes 
and tolls in low-denomination coins, several countries have declined to 
enlist expansive notions of disorderly conduct, public nuisance, or the 
like. Rather, they have simply decreed that their smallest units of cur-
rency cease to count as legal tender when aggregated above a certain 
amount. In the United Kingdom, for example, “coins of bronze” are not 
legal tender “for payment of any amount . . . exceeding 20 pence.”150 
Attempting to discharge a £200 tax debt with pence is not a provocative 
method of complying with the law in London. It is an underpayment of 
£199.80. 
                                                                                                                           
customarily performed by teachers generally, but not expressly described in their most 
recent collective bargaining agreement,” constituted unprotected strike); Jeld Wen Corp., 
Case 9-CA-28831, 1992 WL 83506, at *1–*2 (NLRB Office of Gen. Counsel Feb. 4, 1992) 
(finding work-to-rule action, in which employees “strictly adher[ed] to Employer 
instructions,” constituted unprotected slowdown). But see, e.g., Riverside Cement Co., 296 
N.L.R.B. 840, 841 (1989) (stating, in decision for employees who alleged unlawful re-
taliation for engaging in work to rule, “[w]here an action is voluntary, the concerted 
refusal by employees to perform that action is a protected concerted activity and does not 
constitute an unlawful partial strike”). 
 148. Boyter v. Comm’r, 668 F.2d 1382, 1388 (4th Cir. 1981). Without expressing a 
view on the merits, the panel remanded the case to the tax court “to determine whether 
the divorces, even if valid under Maryland law, are nonetheless shams and should be disre-
garded for federal income tax purposes for the years in question.” Id. When this hap-
pened, the Boyters divorced for a final time without remarrying, vowing to remain di-
vorced until the law was changed. Graetz, supra note 67, at 37. 
 149. See Schauer, Convergence, supra note 146, at 311–21 (hypothesizing general 
tendency for rules and standards to converge); see also Pierre Schlag, Rules and 
Standards, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 379, 428–29 (1985) (noting “tendency of rules to evolve or 
degenerate . . . into standards, and standards to evolve or degenerate into rules”). When 
standards become “rulified” over time through the efforts of interpreters and enforcers to 
provide more concrete guidance—so that, for example, motorists come to learn that driv-
ing under sixty-five miles per hour in dry weather will be deemed to comply with a direc-
tive to “drive safely”—opportunities for uncivil obedience may reemerge. 
 150. Coinage Act, 1971, c. 24, § 2(1d) (U.K.). For similar rules, see, for example, 
Currency Act 1965 (Cth) s 16(1) (Austl.) (restricting ability to tender payment using coins 
of various denominations); Currency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-52, § 8 (Can.) (same). The 
United States Senate’s new limitations on the filibuster provide another example of a more 
fine-grained set of rules adopted to counteract uncivilly obedient uses of the prior 
regulations. See supra note 102 (describing this development). 
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By putting pressure on the existing rules in these various ways, 
uncivil obedience dynamically refines but also complicates the project of 
regulation. Rules are often preferred to standards because they are 
thought to generate greater certainty, predictability, and uniformity.151 
Uncivil obedience recasts these features as liabilities: The rigidity and 
clarity they generate are what allow dissenters to unsettle the status quo 
from a secure legal perch. To the extent that citizens and officials wish to 
stave off uncivil obedience, then, they may have to forfeit some of the 
benefits of rules and accept the higher levels of indeterminacy, enforce-
ment discretion, and administrative costs associated with standards; or 
else they may have to undergo the trouble of supplementing the current 
rules with more severe rules, which will in turn come with their own 
negative externalities.152 In either event, they will be pushed away from 
their initial choice as to the appropriate mix of rules and standards and 
the desired level of specificity at which to frame directives in a given 
domain. Uncivil obedience reveals the latent subversive potential of regu-
latory precision, and in so doing both catalyzes legal change and raises 
the cost of lawmaking. 
B. Transsubstantive Doctrines 
Legal designers may also seek to constrain uncivil obedience in a 
more comprehensive fashion, through general principles or “interstitial 
norms” that condition all uses of law by certain subjects.153 In contem-
porary practice, the doctrines of abuse of right, equity, and preemption, 
in particular, have come to serve this function. 
1. Abuse of Right, Equity, and Related Doctrines. — A version of the 
doctrine of abuse of right (abus de droit) appears in many civil-law and 
mixed jurisdictions, as well as in international law.154 The basic idea is 
that conduct that adheres to the plain terms of the law may nonetheless 
be treated as unlawful when sufficiently unreasonable or antisocial—abu-
                                                                                                                           
 151. See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 133, at 16 (summarizing literature). Conversely, 
standards are often praised for, among other things, being easier to craft and fairer as ap-
plied to particular cases. Id. at 17. 
 152. The United Kingdom’s bar on payments in bronze coins exceeding twenty 
pence, for example, knocks out not only disruptive tax protests but also innocent attempts 
by children to empty their piggy banks at the candy store. 
 153. See Vaughan Lowe, The Politics of Law-Making: Are the Method and Character 
of Norm Creation Changing?, in The Role of Law in International Politics 207, 212–21 
(Michael Byers ed., 2000) (defining “interstitial norms” as norms that lack “independent 
normative charge of their own” but instead “direct the manner in which competing or 
conflicting norms that do have their own normativity should interact in practice,” and cit-
ing abuse of right as prominent example). 
 154. For useful surveys, see Council of Europe, Abuse of Rights and Equivalent 
Concepts (1990), and Michael Byers, Abuse of Rights: An Old Principle, A New Age, 47 
McGill L.J. 389 (2002). The doctrine has been substantially codified in European domestic 
systems but remains largely uncodified in international law. 
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sive—in some respect. “In international law,” for example, “abuse of 
rights refers to a State exercising a right either in a way which impedes 
the enjoyment by other States of their own rights or for an end different 
from that for which the right was created, to the injury of another 
State.”155 In the domestic context, the doctrine acts as a safeguard against 
legalistic assertions of rights, powers, privileges, claims, or immunities by 
private parties that are seen to reflect bad faith or to impose unwarranted 
social costs.156 Abuse of right “soften[s] the harshness of the positive law 
and of contractual provisions in light of society’s concerns that transcend 
individual interests.”157 
The narrowest formulations of abuse of right are unlikely to check 
uncivil obedience. Focused on the right holder’s subjective intent, these 
formulations ask whether causing harm to another was her only or pre-
dominant purpose in acting as she did.158 The classic example is the land-
owner who erects a tall fence on her property for the sole, spiteful end of 
depriving her neighbor of light.159 A somewhat looser and more objective 
version of the doctrine proscribes otherwise lawful conduct that lacks any 
“legitimate interest,” as when a landowner “pump[s] from her land the 
                                                                                                                           
 155. Alexandre Kiss, Abuse of Rights, in 1 Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
4, 4 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1992). 
 156. The term “abuse of right” is thus misleadingly narrow insofar as it suggests that 
only Hohfeldian rights are implicated. Cf. Joseph M. Perillo, Abuse of Rights: A Pervasive 
Legal Concept, 27 Pac. L.J. 37, 54 n.76 (1995) (invoking Hohfeld and noting “term ‘abuse 
of rights,’” as used by author and countless others, “encompasses rights, powers, privileges, 
immunities, etc.”). There is a long-running debate over whether the term is more deeply 
misleading because conduct found to be an abuse of right is best understood as never 
having been within the scope of the right, rather than as a genuine exercise of the right 
that loses protection because of its abusive character. See, e.g., 2 Marcel Planiol, Treatise 
on the Civil Law no. 871 (La. State Law Inst. Trans., 11th ed. 1939) (insisting “the right 
ceases where the abuse commences”); Frederick Schauer, Can Rights Be Abused?, 31 Phil. 
Q. 225, 225–27 (1981) (exploring this puzzle). 
 157. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Civil Liability for Abuse of Right: Something Old, 
Something New . . . , 54 La. L. Rev. 1173, 1195 (1994); see also Joseph Voyame et al., Abuse 
of Rights in Comparative Law, in Abuse of Rights and Equivalent Concepts, supra note 
154, at 23, 23 (describing abuse of right as “legal mechanism designed to ease the 
inflexibility of the legal relationships derived from statutory, judicial or treaty rules”). 
 158. See Byers, supra note 154, at 393–94 (listing Germany, Italy, and Austria as 
examples of legal systems that conceive of abuse of right in these terms); Voyame et al., 
supra note 157, at 28–31 (listing Italy, Austria, and Liechtenstein as countries that 
continue to employ “extremely narrow” approach of making “malicious intent . . . the sole 
essential element of the abuse”). The German Civil Code, for example, provides that 
“‘[t]he exercise of a right is unlawful, if its purpose can only be to cause damage to 
another.’” Byers, supra note 154, at 393 (quoting Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil 
Code] art. 226 (Ger.), translated in The German Civil Code (Simon L. Goren trans., 
1994)). 
 159. See Anna di Robilant, Abuse of Rights: The Continental Drug and the Common 
Law, 61 Hastings L.J. 687, 691 (2010) (identifying this as “classical textbook example” of 
abuse of right). 
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groundwater feeding her neighbor’s mill only to end up wasting it.”160 
Uncivil obedience, as we have defined it, is all but certain to evade these 
understandings of abuse of right. The limited class of malicious and arbi-
trary acts they condemn is readily distinguishable from the uncivil obe-
dient’s conscientious and communicative attempt to effect lasting change 
to law or policy. 
Broader formulations of abuse of right, however, can pose a signif-
icant challenge to uncivil obedience. Some of these formulations ask if 
the right holder’s conduct is contrary to the “normal function” of the 
right or its “socio-economic purpose,”161 while others ask if her conduct 
is unreasonable “in the light of the prevailing social conscience”162 or in 
light of “the disproportion between [her] interest to exercise the right 
and the harm caused thereby.”163 All of these broader variants focus, in 
one way or another, on “the act itself” and whether it is “abnormal or 
excessive” or “its consequences unacceptable.”164 Often a form of teleo-
logical reasoning underwrites these inquiries. Abuse is taken to occur 
when the right holder’s behavior is facially consistent with formal law but 
“inconsistent with the aim of the institution, its spirit and its ultimate 
purpose.”165 
It is not hard to imagine how these notions of abuse of right could 
be applied to stifle uncivil obedience. Employees who engage in work to 
rule could be (and have been) accused of undermining the “normal 
function” of the workplace.166 Taxpayers who pay in pennies could be 
accused of acting in an unreasonable or antisocial manner. Critics who 
advocate maxing out the welfare system could be accused of subverting 
the socioeconomic purpose of public benefits laws. And so on. Even the 
National Motorists Association members who drove at the speed limit 
might have been charged with abusing the freeway laws’ “ultimate pur-
                                                                                                                           
 160. Id.; see also Voyame et al., supra note 157, at 31–35 (discussing countries that 
“define any harmful act perpetrated in the absence of legitimate interest as an abuse”). 
 161. Di Robilant, supra note 159, at 691–92; see also, e.g., John H. Crabb, The 
French Concept of Abuse of Rights, 6 Inter-Am. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1964) (“When the right is 
being abused, the actor is technically or mechanically within the formal limits of the right 
accorded, and may also be acting carefully. But he is not employing the right in conformity 
with its nature and purpose . . . .”). 
 162. Kazuaki Sono & Yasuhiro Fujioka, The Role of the Abuse of Right Doctrine in 
Japan, 35 La. L. Rev. 1037, 1037 (1975). 
 163. Byers, supra note 154, at 395 (quoting BW art. 13(2) (Neth.), translated in New 
Netherlands Civil Code (P.P.C. Haanappel & Ejan Mackaay trans., 1990)). 
 164. Voyame et al., supra note 157, at 35 (summarizing approach of countries that 
“apply an objective conception of abuse of rights”). 
 165. Id. at 33 (quoting Louis Josserand, “the father” of modern French abuse-of-right 
theory). 
 166. See di Robilant, supra note 159, at 691–92 (“At the height of nineteenth-century 
industrial struggles [in Europe], unions were found to abuse their right to strike when 
their action departed from the right’s ‘normal function.’”). 
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pose” of ensuring the smooth and safe flow of traffic. If this logic were 
extended to domestic public law, abuse of right could provide a powerful 
basis for attacking behaviors such as Senate minorities’ relentless use of 
the hold and other procedural privileges.167 
Uncivil obedience, once again, provokes by exploiting gaps between 
the letter of legal directives and the customs or purposes associated with 
them. The broadest versions of the abuse-of-right doctrine close these 
gaps as a matter of law. They effectively impose a requirement of civility 
on all legal transactions. If prohibitions on disorderly conduct, public 
nuisance, and the like can curb uncivil obedience through a mix of 
discrete rules and standards, abuse of right may amount to a roving 
super-standard—with super-sized implications for the typical costs and 
benefits associated with the regulatory form. As compared to a patchwork 
of directives that target incivility in specific domains, a broad doctrine of 
abuse of right is significantly easier to develop and adapt to new circum-
stances. It is also significantly more likely to generate confusion, chilling 
effects, and executive and judicial discretion.168 
Outside the civil-law enclave of Louisiana,169 the doctrine of abuse of 
right has played little explicit role in the Anglo-American legal system. 
Late-nineteenth-century English cases arguably reject the doctrine’s 
subjective formulations altogether, as in Lord Halsbury’s famous state-
ment in Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles that “[i]f it was a lawful act, however ill 
the motive might be, he had a right to do it.”170 Yet as several scholars 
have documented, the United States and other common-law jurisdictions 
nevertheless employ a number of concepts that serve a comparable func-
tion in private law “under such labels as nuisance, duress, good faith, 
economic waste, public policy, misuse of copyright and patent rights, lack 
                                                                                                                           
 167. See supra notes 96–102 and accompanying text (describing these Senate 
behaviors). At present, the doctrine of abuse of right “is rarely mentioned in constitu-
tional law,” although some influential European jurists have begun to urge this change. 
András Sajó, Abuse of Fundamental Rights or the Difficulties of Purposiveness, in Abuse: 
The Dark Side of Fundamental Rights 29, 33 (András Sajó ed., 2006). Abuse of right has 
been “neglected” in public law, according to Sajó, because of the prominence of concepts 
such as “discretionary power and legislative sovereignty” and the privileging of “categor-
ical” (rather than balancing) approaches to rights. Id. at 34. 
 168. On the notorious vagueness of abuse of right, see, for example, Robert Krieps, 
General Report, in Abuse of Rights and Equivalent Concepts, supra note 154, at 166, 173 
(“[E]ven an experienced jurist . . . would be hard put to say precisely what was the 
criterion that determined that a right had been abused . . . .”); Voyame et al., supra note 
157, at 23 (“[W]ithin most countries, there is no unanimous agreement as to the scope of 
the prohibition of abuse of rights; doctrinal disputes and contradictory judgments are 
commonplace.”). 
 169. See generally Yiannopoulos, supra note 157 (reviewing history of abuse of right 
in Louisiana law). 
 170. [1895] A.C. 587 (H.L.) 594 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
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of business purpose in tax law, extortion, and others.”171 Where these 
concepts apply, they may similarly serve to constrain uncivil obedience. 
An unanticipated, mechanistic application of a contract term, for exam-
ple, might be construed to violate the implied duty of good faith.172 
Historically, equity has played an especially important role in 
common-law systems in policing conduct that adheres to a law’s form-
alistic requirements but clashes with the purposes or values the law was 
meant to serve. Many of the concepts discussed just above “are them-
selves largely . . . the result of the gravitational pull of the equitable doc-
trines that provide the judicial recourse of last resort to invalidate facially 
legal conduct when the available interpretive strategies would strain cre-
dulity and undermine legal meaning generally.”173 According to Henry 
Smith’s “safety valve” theory of equity, its principal function has been to 
prevent opportunistic behavior that would be too costly to define and 
deter ex ante.174 Like abuse of right in civil systems, equity supplies com-
mon lawyers with a highly adaptable “anti-opportunism device.”175 
It is important to see, however, that the success of equity and its off-
shoots in preventing uncivil obedience has been incomplete. This is so 
for at least two main reasons. First, as Smith notes, equity intervenes “in a 
limited domain.”176 Even if the “distinctive traditions of equity now per-
vade the legal system” in some sense following the merger of law and 
                                                                                                                           
 171. Perillo, supra note 156, at 40; see also, e.g., D.J. Devine, Some Comparative 
Aspects of the Doctrine of Abuse of Rights, 1964 Acta Juridica 148, 164 (“Despite the lack 
of any general principle of abuse of right, . . . in some particular instances, English Law 
does admit what amounts to [such] a doctrine . . . . These instances occur mainly in the 
law of nuisance, conspiracy, abuse of process and qualified privilege in defamation.”); di 
Robilant, supra note 159, at 696 (arguing abuse of right “was silently at work” in English 
and especially American private law during late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
through “functional equivalents” such as “‘malice’ tests and ‘reasonable user’ rules”). 
 172. But cf. Perillo, supra note 156, at 69–77 (emphasizing haziness surrounding idea 
of good faith in American contract law and arguing abuse-of-right framework would be 
clearer and more constraining). 
 173. Email from Jody S. Kraus, Patricia D. & R. Paul Yetter Professor of Law and 
Professor of Philosophy, Columbia Law Sch., to authors (Sept. 8, 2014, 3:26 PM EDT) (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 174. Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Law Versus Equity (Oct. 22, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/LEO/ 
HSmith_LawVersusEquity7.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). For a similar theory 
of the duty of good faith in civilian contract law, see Ejan Mackaay, The Economics of Civil 
Law Contract and of Good Faith 15 (2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
https://papyrus.bib.umontreal.ca/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1866/3016/Mackaay_Trebilc
ock-Symposium%20_3_.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing good faith 
supplies “residual concept with which to fashion new remedies [for opportunism] where 
no existing one is appropriate”). 
 175. Smith, supra note 174, at 33. 
 176. Id. at 53. 
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equity in most U.S. courts,177 formalism, clear rules, and other limits on 
judicial discretion continue to cabin equity’s reach,178 especially in public 
law.179 Second, uncivil obedience does not necessarily involve opportun-
ism, either in the economists’ sense of “self-interest seeking with guile”180 
or in Smith’s preferred formulation of behavior “that would be contract-
ed away if ex ante transaction costs were lower” and that “often violates 
moral norms.”181 Given its conscientiousness and reformist ambition, un-
civil obedience is a more morally ambiguous category. Even where equi-
table principles do hold sway, they may not condemn uncivil obedience. 
This Article’s examples reflect as much. Senators who have made 
“uncivil” use of their procedural privileges have suffered no legal sanc-
tion. Neither did the National Motorists Association members who drove 
at the speed limit; nor did Stephen Colbert when he strategized with the 
head of his Super PAC on television without technically “coordinating”; 
nor did any number of lawyers and activists who have tried to “crash” the 
criminal justice and public benefits systems. Not coincidentally, the ex-
amples that come closest to ordinary opportunism—the Boyters’ divorce-
and-remarry scheme and work to rule—have encountered greater legal 
resistance. Yet even these cases reveal the limits of that resistance. 
Although one appeals court eventually suggested that the Boyters’ di-
vorces might be treated as “sham” transactions, it never ruled on the 
issue.182 And while some work-to-rule campaigns have been treated as un-
                                                                                                                           
 177. Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56 Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 
1993, at 53, 53. 
 178. See, e.g., Paul MacMahon, Good Faith and Fair Dealing as an Underenforced 
Legal Norm, 99 Minn. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 38–49) (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (detailing “underenforcement” of duty of good faith in American 
contract law). 
 179. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet: Tradition, History, and 
Limitations on Federal Judicial Power—A Case Study, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1291, 1292 
(2000) (“It did not take long after Professor Chayes celebrated the ‘triumph of equity’ in 
public law litigation to recognize that the announcement was premature . . . . (quoting 
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1292 
(1976))); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., No Final Victories: The Incompleteness of Equity’s 
Triumph in Federal Public Law, 56 Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 1993, at 105, 105 
(reviewing cases “demonstrating the limited nature of equity’s ‘triumph’ in federal public 
law” and modern Supreme Court’s “hostility toward the spirit of equity” in this area); 
David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 Harv. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2016) 
(manuscript at 8–19) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (documenting margin-
alization of principle of good faith in American constitutional law); cf. Vernon Valentine 
Palmer, “May God Protect Us from the Equity of Parlements”: Comparative Reflections on 
English and French Equity Power, 73 Tul. L. Rev. 1287, 1292 (1999) (“[Historically,] 
English equity was confined to private law. It had little or no public-law dimension or 
application . . . .”). Abuse of right has been similarly sidelined in European countries’ 
domestic public law. Supra note 167. 
 180. Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 47 (1985). 
 181. Smith, supra note 174, at 9. 
 182. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (discussing this litigation). 
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protected partial strikes, others have fared much better in court,183 and 
the National Labor Relations Board “has not directly addressed the legal 
status of work-to-rule or delineated when it crosses the line into unpro-
tected partial strike activity.”184 
In sum, both the spirit of equity and its specific doctrinal manifes-
tations in American contract law, tort law, and elsewhere may be enlisted 
to rein in uncivil obedience, especially when it comes across as deceptive 
or self-serving. But they have not foreclosed this mode of dissent. In con-
temporary practice, abuse of right appears to offer a more powerful tool 
for disciplining and deterring uncivil obedience. 
These observations raise the interesting—and potentially test-
able185—question whether uncivil obedience tends to flourish in 
common-law jurisdictions relative to civil-law jurisdictions (thus making 
the “uncivil” label all the more appropriate). The lack of a standalone 
doctrine of abuse of right would seem to put uncivil obedience on a 
firmer legal footing in the United States than, say, in France; all else 
equal, Americans who exercise their rights in unconventional and dis-
ruptive ways ought to face lower odds of formal sanction across various 
areas of law. They may also face lower odds of informal condemnation, 
inasmuch as the very existence of an abuse-of-right doctrine makes it 
easier for people in civil-law countries to recognize hyperbolic adherence 
to law as a form of incivility, as a potential “abuse” of the system rather 
than an unusually restrained mode of dissent. The absence of this doc-
trine in the United States, moreover, may reflect features of our legal 
culture that facilitate uncivil obedience in a deeper sense, such as com-
paratively low levels of comfort with teleology and balancing as inter-
pretive methods, or comparatively high levels of reverence for text-based 
reasoning and liberal individualism.186 
2. Preemption. — Abuse of right and related doctrines can thus serve 
as a check against the uncivil obedience of private parties, as well as 
nation-states, by stripping legal protection from a more or less open-
ended set of legalistic incivilities. These doctrines, however, remain on 
the margins of domestic public law in general and American public law 
in particular. And as we have noted, a federal system such as the United 
                                                                                                                           
 183. See supra note 147 and accompanying text (noting mixed case law in this area). 
 184. Robert M. Schwartz, Strikes, Picketing, and Inside Campaigns 30 (2006). 
 185. The empirical and methodological challenges would be formidable, but re-
searchers could conceivably perform interjurisdictional comparisons of rates of work-to-
rule actions, tax payments in coins, efforts to flood the courts, and so forth. At a min-
imum, surveys and laboratory experiments could be used to test perceptions of various 
kinds of uncivil obedience across common-law and civil-law subjects. 
 186. Cf. H.C. Gutteridge, Abuse of Rights, 5 Cambridge L.J. 22, 22 (1933) (asserting 
“theory of the abuse of rights . . . has been rejected by our [Anglo-American] law” in favor 
of “theory of the extent of individual rights which can only be described as the 
consecration of the spirit of unrestricted egoism”). 
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States’ is ripe for an especially vexing type of uncivil obedience—when 
states enact measures that flaunt their superficial attentiveness to federal 
law or policy while at the same time attempting to subvert it.187 Beyond 
any of the constitutional principles that limit state legislative authority in 
specific domains, the transsubstantive doctrine of preemption offers the 
most significant safeguard against this legislative variant of uncivil 
obedience. 
Obstacle preemption is the key. As currently configured, U.S. pre-
emption doctrine reaches not only state laws that are expressly displaced 
by federal law or that occupy a regulatory field understood to belong 
exclusively to the federal government, but also state laws that impliedly 
conflict with federal law. Such a conflict may arise either when “com-
pliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impos-
sibility”188 or, more broadly, when state law “stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”189 This broader strand of implied preemption doctrine paral-
lels the broader strands of abuse-of-right doctrine in its privileging of 
functional and purposive considerations, and in the discretion that is 
consequently afforded to judges.190 Like abuse of right, obstacle 
preemption refuses to accept that technical compatibility with legal 
language ensures substantive legality. 
Arizona v. United States provides a notable recent example of how 
obstacle preemption can thwart uncivil obedience.191 As explained in 
Part II, the legal architects of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 sought to insulate 
themselves from a preemption challenge, even as they railed against the 
federal government’s immigration policy, by “mirroring” the terms of 
federal immigration law: A state statute can hardly be said to conflict with 
a federal statute, they argued, when the two use the same words.192 In 
dissent, Justice Scalia credited this approach with ensuring “complete 
compliance” with federal law.193 A majority of the Justices, however, 
rejected the mirror-image theory on the ground that key provisions of 
S.B. 1070 were designed to “undermine federal law” rather than 
                                                                                                                           
 187. See supra Part II.B.4. 
 188. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963). 
 189. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
 190. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000) 
(“What is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the 
federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects.”). 
 191. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012); see also supra notes 119–122 and accompanying text 
(describing Arizona’s challenged immigration law). 
 192. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (explaining “mirror-image theory”). 
 193. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2522 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
see also id. at 2521 (“[T]o say, as the Court does, that Arizona contradicts federal law by 
enforcing applications of the Immigration Act that the President declines to enforce 
boggles the mind.”). 
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reinforce it,194 creating “an obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress” in regulating immigration.195 Meticulously reprising the terms 
of federal law, the Court reasoned, can be just as disruptive as openly 
rejecting them. Although the facts of Arizona may be peculiar, this 
reasoning is broadly generalizable. A concern with uncivil obedience 
could lead judges to look warily at state efforts at self-insulation far be-
yond the preemption-heavy realms of immigration and foreign affairs.196 
Arizona v. United States is instructive in another respect as well. To 
thwart state uncivil obedience, preemption doctrine may need to cast the 
executive branch’s delegated discretion as part of the federal law that has 
preemptive effect. The State of Arizona argued that to the extent S.B. 
1070 differed from federal immigration policy, it departed only from the 
federal executive branch’s lax enforcement, not from the underlying 
congressional mandate.197 But the Court declined to parse legislative and 
executive power in this way. Instead, it conceived of the executive’s en-
forcement discretion as an integral component of Congress’s design.198 
The Justices in the majority were not troubled by the alleged gap that 
had opened up between the relatively rigid law on the books and the 
more flexible law in action. By construing such gaps as a feature rather 
than a bug of a federal statutory scheme, courts make it much more diffi-
cult for states to challenge federal policy as the ostensible agents of 
Congress. 
Obstacle preemption and, especially, the assigning of preemptive 
effect to executive-branch actions are both controversial propositions.199 
                                                                                                                           
 194. Id. at 2510 (majority opinion). 
 195. Id. at 2507; see also id. at 2505 (“Arizona law would interfere with the careful 
balance struck by Congress with respect to unauthorized employment of aliens.”). 
 196. State laws touching on immigration and foreign affairs have been invalidated on 
grounds of field, as well as conflict, preemption. In Arizona, the Supreme Court invoked 
both field and conflict preemption, even, oddly enough, with regard to the same provision 
of the state law. See id. at 2503 (noting certain “specific conflicts between state and federal 
law simply underscore the reason for field preemption”). 
 197. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (reviewing Arizona’s argument). 
 198. See Adam B. Cox, Enforcement Redundancy and the Future of Immigration 
Law, 2012 Sup. Ct. Rev. 31, 33 (arguing Arizona “endors[es] the idea that immigration law 
is centrally the product of executive ‘lawmaking’ that bears little relation to immigration 
law on the books”). Similar reasoning appeared in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee 
with respect to state tort law. 531 U.S. 341 (2001). The Buckman Court emphasized that 
“the federal statutory scheme amply empowers the FDA to punish and deter fraud against 
the Administration,” and held that the FDA’s discretion in exercising this authority 
amounted to part of the federal law bearing preemptive effect. Id. at 348. 
 199. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 583 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (“I have become increasingly skeptical of this Court’s ‘purposes and 
objectives’ pre-emption jurisprudence. Under this approach, the Court routinely inval-
idates state laws based on perceived conflicts with broad federal policy objectives, legis-
lative history, or generalized notions of congressional purposes that are not embodied 
within the text of federal law.”); Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. 
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We take no position in this Article on whether they should be extended 
or curtailed in light of the phenomenon of legalistic state dissent.200 Our 
claims here are that these doctrines are well-suited to identifying and 
checking such dissent; that they already play this regulatory role; and that 
it is impossible to assess them without considering the varieties of uncivil 
obedience to which they may respond. 
C. Decentralized Dynamics 
Thus far, this Part has focused on governmental responses to uncivil 
obedience, involving the adoption and implementation of official doc-
trines and directives. In many contexts, however, informal dynamics may 
play a large role in regulating these acts of dissent. Uncivil obedience 
manages to be uncivil and obedient at the same time by defying unwrit-
ten norms concerning how the law is to be followed or applied. Where 
these norms exert stronger disciplinary force, then, we should tend to 
see less uncivil obedience. Three broad sets of variables are especially 
relevant. 
First, uncivil obedience may be subject to more intensive nonlegal 
regulation in close-knit environments with high degrees of interaction, 
information flow, and trust among the participants.201 In these environ-
ments, a substantial literature has shown, norms of reciprocity and 
decency often emerge and suppress antisocial behavior.202 Once estab-
                                                                                                                           
Rev. 869, 871 (2008) (contending preemption based on agency activity “seem[s] to shift 
preemptive authority from Congress to the agency—a result that contravenes both the text 
of the Supremacy Clause and the structural safeguards of federalism and separation of 
powers”). 
 200. As a growing literature emphasizes, there are many reasons one might welcome 
state dissent from federal policy and accordingly be wary of “civilizing” reforms. See gen-
erally Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 114, at 1284–94 (identifying potential benefits 
of “uncooperative federalism”); Hills, supra note 112, at 4 (proposing “often competitive 
interaction between the levels of government” can make “Congress a more honest and 
democratically accountable regulator of conduct throughout the nation”); Ernest A. 
Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 130–34 (2004) (arguing 
limiting federal preemption of state law would advance values such as citizen participation 
and deliberation). 
 201. Cf. supra note 62 (discussing different types of environments in which uncivil 
obedience may occur). 
 202. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law 167–78 (1991) (defining 
close-knit groups as ones in which “informal power is broadly distributed among group 
members and the information pertinent to informal control circulates easily among 
them,” and arguing their members will tend to develop and maintain welfare-enhancing 
norms of cooperation); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal 
Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. Legal Stud. 115, 140 (1992) 
(discussing importance of “geographical concentration, ethnic homogeneity, and repeat 
dealing” for emergence of reputational norms). But cf. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Social 
Norms from Close-Knit Groups to Loose-Knit Groups, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 359, passim & 365 
n.31 (2003) (exploring conditions under which cooperative norms can arise in non-close-
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lished, moreover, these cooperation-promoting norms may operate 
independently from, and even in the teeth of, formal legal entitle-
ments.203 Compared to a driver or a taxpayer considering whether to 
comply with the freeway speed limit or the federal tax code in a formally 
lawful yet unconventional manner, a homeowner in a close-knit neigh-
borhood considering whether to register her dissent by taking advantage 
of a technicality in the zoning code is more likely to have internalized 
social norms that hold her back (at least, assuming her neighbors are not 
already known to support her goals and methods). She is more likely to 
resist the turn to legalism. To the extent that private law tends to regulate 
more closely knit settings than does public law, these points suggest that 
uncivil obedience should have a firmer foothold in the latter—above all 
in the anomic space where ordinary citizens confront the regulatory 
state. This Article’s examples of challenges to the welfare system, the 
criminal justice system, and the Internal Revenue Service, among other 
public bureaucracies, provide some anecdotal support for this 
speculation.204 
These points may also bear on the incidence of uncivil obedience 
within certain governmental settings. The United States Senate was 
known throughout the mid-twentieth century as a “gentleman’s club,”205 
a “communitarian” institution “in which norms of restraint and 
reciprocity governed senators’ behavior.”206 By the late 1980s, however, 
the Senate had become a very different body, characterized by individ-
ualism, mutual mistrust, and a deep and widening partisan divide.207 The 
Senate, in other words, became less close-knit (in the Ellicksonian sense) 
even though its size stayed the same. This transformation, in turn, facil-
itated an erosion of unwritten norms of comity and solidarity that had 
                                                                                                                           
knit settings and positing that members’ ability to monitor noncooperation and commu-
nicate about each other’s reputations matters more than group size per se). 
 203. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 202, at 4 (“Neighbors in fact are strongly inclined 
to cooperate, but they achieve cooperative outcomes not by bargaining from legally estab-
lished entitlements, . . . but rather by developing and enforcing adaptive norms or 
neighborliness that trump formal legal entitlements.”); cf. Eric A. Posner, Law and Social 
Norms 12 (2002) (“[T]hat people do not rely on the law to solve day-to-day cooperative 
problems is clear from both formal research . . . and casual empiricism.”). 
 204. See supra notes 34–35, 67, 74–79 and accompanying text (presenting these 
examples). 
 205. See U.S. Senate, Citadel, https://www.senate.gov/reference/reference_item/ 
Citadel.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Mar. 25, 2015) (crediting 
William S. White’s 1957 book The Citadel with “populariz[ing] the idea of the Senate as a 
‘gentlemen’s club’”). 
 206. Sarah Binder, Through the Looking Glass, Darkly: What Has Become of the 
Senate?, Forum: J. Applied Res. Contemp. Pol., Dec. 2011, art. 2, at 1, 1. 
 207. See id. at 1–7 (discussing breakdown of comity in Senate). 
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previously curbed the use of uncivil obedience with respect to the cham-
ber’s procedural rules.208 
Second, and relatedly, uncivil obedience is less likely to flourish in 
settings where cooperation-promoting norms are backed by effective 
informal sanctions. As discussed in Part II, while acts of uncivil obedience 
are believed to be lawful, this hardly guarantees they will escape punish-
ment.209 Informal sanctions such as retaliation, ridicule, and ostracism 
can substitute for formal sanctions as correctives and deterrents to 
perceived incivilities.210 Employees who engage in work to rule, for exam-
ple, may face any manner of unofficial reprisal from their managers, 
even in situations where the labor laws appear to protect the employees’ 
conduct.211 Because close-knit groups typically find it easier to impose 
sanctions based on reputation or reciprocity,212 they are better equipped 
to enforce as well as to develop extralegal prohibitions on legalistic dis-
sent. More generally, all of the factors thought to enhance the efficacy of 
social sanctions against deviant behaviors in a given setting—from repeat 
play to monitoring to in-group homogeneity—may tend to correlate with 
lower levels of uncivil obedience. 
Third, and more generally still, prospects for uncivil obedience will 
invariably be shaped by the surrounding legal culture and the criteria of 
legal validity that it recognizes. To take a stylized illustration: In Society A 
where most officials subscribe to a version of formalism conjoined with 
“exclusive” or “hard” legal positivism, it will be widely agreed that deter-
mining the existence and content of law depends exclusively on social 
facts concerning the source of relevant norms, not on moral principles, 
and that decisionmaking should be constrained by the specific linguistic 
formulation of those norms.213 There is nothing inherently odd, in such a 
                                                                                                                           
 208. See supra notes 96–102 and accompanying text (discussing senatorial uncivil 
obedience). 
 209. See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text (noting possible formal and 
informal responses to uncivil obedience). 
 210. On the varieties of informal sanctions that may be applied, see, for example, 
Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special 
Reference to Sanctions, 19 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 369, 370–72 (1999) (cataloging “sanctions 
that enforce [social] norms”). 
 211. See, e.g., Caterpillar, Inc., 322 N.L.R.B. 674 (1996) (discussing supervisor’s 
informal and formal retaliation against employees for engaging in protected work-to-rule 
behaviors). 
 212. See, e.g., Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 
Mich. L. Rev. 1880, 1916 (1991) (“Informal sanctions appear to work best within relatively 
bounded, close-knit communities, whose members ‘don’t mind their own business’ and 
who rely on each other.”). 
 213. “Inclusive,” “soft,” or “incorporationist” positivism, in contrast, holds that the 
existence and content of law may depend on moral principles insofar as they are explicitly 
or implicitly incorporated into a society’s rule of recognition. See generally Andrei 
Marmor, Exclusive Legal Positivism, in The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and 
Philosophy of Law 104 (Jules L. Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) (comparing 
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society, about the notion of a protester complying with a statute in a 
hyper-technical manner that others find offensive. So long as the statute 
is properly “pedigreed” and the protester’s actions seem consistent with 
its terms, even critics will have little choice but to concede the legality of 
her tactics. If uncivil obedience reveals that a law’s text may be wielded in 
troubling ways, that is a basis for revising the law, not for casting legal 
doubt on the troublemaker’s conduct. 
By contrast, in Society B where most everyone eschews formalism 
and subscribes to a version of natural law, Dworkinian law-as-integrity, or 
another strongly “substantive” understanding of law,214 the idea that a 
statute could be used to such subversive effect will be more jarring. Con-
fronted with the taxpayer who pays in pennies or the executive who 
prosecutes an offense with unprecedented zeal, people would ask them-
selves whether this behavior is consonant with legislative purposes, estab-
lished customs, principles of justice and fairness, or the like. And if they 
came to the conclusion that the answer was “no,” then they might have 
cause to challenge the behavior’s lawfulness, notwithstanding its tech-
nical conformity to the language of a duly enacted statute. Questions 
about a tactic’s political morality would be inextricably bound up (to var-
ious degrees and in various ways, depending on the operative theory of 
law) with the question of its legality. Even if these two societies share the 
exact same laws on the books, then, the would-be uncivil obedient who 
contemplates “exploiting” the letter of the rules in some disruptive fash-
ion can have less confidence in B that she would actually be operating 
within the law. 
Of course, there may be little that anyone can do to precipitate a 
societal shift away from positivism or formalism, or to recalibrate the 
informal norms and sanctions that obtain in a given setting. Unlike pre-
emption doctrine or the choice between rules and standards, the decen-
tralized dynamics sketched here are not necessarily amenable to social 
engineering. It is at least conceivable, however, that greater awareness of 
uncivil obedience would influence relevant attitudes or interpretive ap-
proaches at the margins. And whatever their prescriptive potential, these 
dynamics may go a long way toward shaping local experiences of uncivil 
obedience. 
                                                                                                                           
exclusive and inclusive legal positivism); see also Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 Yale 
L.J. 509, 510 (1988) (defining formalism as decisionmaking constrained by “specific 
linguistic formulation of a rule”). Our aim in this paragraph and the next is to convey the 
basic sense in which uncivil obedience may be facilitated by legal formalism and 
positivism. There are countless jurisprudential nuances that we gloss over in the effort to 
offer a succinct statement of the issue. 
 214. See Simon, supra note 32, at 79–85 (proposing “substantivism” as umbrella term 
for all conceptions of law that reject core premises of positivism). Dworkin’s notion of “law 
as integrity” is developed in Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 176–224 (1986). 
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IV. CONTEXTUALIZING AND CRITIQUING UNCIVIL OBEDIENCE 
The practice of civil disobedience raises urgent and obvious ques-
tions of justification. Insofar as people in a reasonably well-functioning 
liberal democracy have a prima facie obligation to obey the law,215 acts of 
law-breaking come with a taint of illegitimacy. Theorists of civil disobe-
dience, accordingly, have devoted substantial attention to the issue of 
when it may be morally justified, proposing conditions such as the exis-
tence of extreme injustice, willingness to submit to punishment, and 
exhaustion of lawful channels of dissent.216 Acts of uncivil obedience, in 
contrast, would appear to require no such special defense given that they 
are understood to abide by the positive law of the jurisdiction. It is the 
skeptic of uncivil obedience, on this view, who bears the burden of estab-
lishing conditions under which its use is not legitimate. 
In this Part, we offer reasons to doubt the utility of this view for 
capturing the two practices’ relationship to public values, especially 
where governmental uncivil obedience is concerned. This brief discus-
sion is meant to be suggestive rather than conclusive. We do not offer any 
general theory of uncivil obedience, nor do we wade into broader de-
bates in analytic jurisprudence and political philosophy over the nature 
of legal obligation or the justifiability of resistance to authority. Rather, 
we highlight several features of uncivil obedience that bear on normative 
assessment, with special reference to the ways in which they compare to 
corresponding features of civil disobedience. We also consider the inter-
action of uncivil obedience with ideology and partisanship. In these ways, 
we hope to demonstrate further the practical and philosophical signif-
icance of uncivil obedience and to lay groundwork for future research. 
Examples of uncivil obedience such as the ones collected in this 
Article—and we are surely missing many—can both motivate and inform 
this research. Morally compelling acts of civil disobedience by American 
civil-rights protesters in the 1960s inspired searching inquiry into the 
place of law-breaking in a free society. Perhaps certain contemporary or 
future cases of uncivil obedience might spark a parallel conversation on 
the problematics of law-following as a mode of dissent. 
A. Public Law Values 
In assessing a phenomenon as rich and multifarious as uncivil obedi-
ence or civil disobedience, “[p]recise principles that straightaway decide 
                                                                                                                           
 215. This proposition is vigorously disputed by numerous philosophers. See 
Frederick Schauer, Official Obedience and the Politics of Defining “Law,” 86 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
1165, 1167 n.10 (2013) (collecting sources). 
 216. See Markovits, supra note 9, at 1898–901 (reviewing prominent efforts to 
“determine[] the metes and bounds of justified liberal disobedience”). 
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actual cases are clearly out of the question.”217 As with dissent in gen-
eral,218 uncivil obedience has the capacity to advance social welfare and 
social justice in a wide range of contexts. This is most likely to occur 
when the tactics employed are minimally disruptive or coercive, espe-
cially as to third parties; when the critical message is broadly appealing or 
neglected in public debate; and when the targeted law or policy is itself 
welfare- or justice-reducing. The optimal amount of uncivil obedience in 
any society, it bears emphasis, is greater than zero. Yet if the potential 
public benefits of uncivil obedience seem fairly straightforward—because 
continuous in kind with the benefits associated with other forms of dis-
sent, including civil disobedience—the potential costs of uncivil obedi-
ence are somewhat subtler. 
As an initial matter, those who ascribe normative significance to the 
effectuation of legislative purposes or to local customs of law-following 
have pro tanto reason to disapprove of uncivil obedience. Uncivil obedi-
ence manages to provoke from within the law’s four corners by defying 
expectations and traditions as to how a directive will or should be acted 
on. It is not hard to see, for example, how a Burkean who believes those 
expectations and traditions are a repository of collective wisdom219 might 
be concerned by recent transformations in the way Senate minorities 
wield their procedural privileges.220 Or consider the civil-law doctrine of 
abuse of right, which seeks, in one common formulation, to strip legal 
protection from otherwise lawful conduct because it flouts the perceived 
purpose or spirit of a law.221 This is precisely what makes the conduct 
“abusive.” 
The point here is simple but important: The very manner in which 
uncivil obedience “works” is by going against certain behavioral regular-
ities or social understandings in which some commentators see consid-
erable intrinsic or instrumental merit. Just as those who believe there is a 
prima facie moral obligation to obey the law have presumptive reason to 
disapprove of civil disobedience, those who have a principled commit-
                                                                                                                           
 217. Rawls, supra note 6, at 364. 
 218. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent (2003) (arguing 
dissent performs variety of valuable social functions). 
 219. See, e.g., Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Elliot 38 (7th rev. 
ed. 2001) (reading Burke to teach “even the most intelligent of men cannot hope to 
understand all the secrets of traditional morals and social arrangements; but we may be 
sure that Providence, acting through the medium of human trial and error, has developed 
every hoary habit for some important purpose”). 
 220. See supra notes 96–102 and accompanying text (describing these transfor-
mations). Those who believe that unwritten “constitutional conventions” tend to promote 
stability, efficiency, or fairness in a political system might be similarly concerned about 
such intragovernmental uncivil obedience. See Pozen, Self-Help, supra note 101, at 27–48 
(explaining constitutional conventions and their application to U.S. context). 
 221. See supra Part III.B.1 (exploring relationship between abuse of right and uncivil 
obedience). 
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ment to purposivism or Burkeanism in the implementation of law have 
presumptive reason to disapprove of uncivil obedience.222 
Others may be more concerned about uncivil obedience’s implica-
tions for various public law values.223 Although it conforms to the letter of 
applicable directives, and in that narrow sense upholds the rule of law, 
the practice of uncivil obedience can threaten related ideals such as 
social comity, accountability, and regularity. Meanwhile, uncivil obedi-
ence’s law-breaking counterpart, civil disobedience, may better serve 
some of these same ideals. We do not mean to condemn uncivil obedi-
ence (or to celebrate civil disobedience) by calling attention to these 
points. We do mean to build on the civil disobedience literature in fur-
ther complicating the intuitive association of law-abidingness with the 
substantive goals of law. 
Perhaps most obviously, acts of uncivil obedience may undermine 
honesty and transparency. Because civil disobedience involves overt law-
breaking, disclosures about the actor’s true, reformist intentions will tend 
to mitigate her legal and reputational exposure, by casting her trans-
gressive conduct in a more sympathetic light. In contrast, because uncivil 
obedience involves ostentatious law-following, such disclosures may not 
mollify but instead inflame critics—and invite hostile revisions or reinter-
pretations of the enabling rules224—by clarifying or confirming a sub-
versive agenda. The typical civil disobedient has greater incentive to be 
forthcoming about the nature of her protest; candor holds strategic as 
well as ethical appeal for her. The overall practice of civil disobedience is 
consequently more intelligible to the world at large, its rhetoric rawer 
and more earnest. Whereas one never hears of a law-breaker who is 
widely seen as an activist or dissident yet insists she is an ordinary 
criminal, one finds quite a few law-followers who are widely seen as 
agents of change yet insist they are no such thing.225 
The direct version of uncivil obedience is closer to civil disobedience 
in this regard.226 The National Motorists Association members who pro-
tested the freeway speed limit by driving at the speed limit; the undoc-
                                                                                                                           
 222. We say “presumptive” because in any given case a wide range of factors, 
including the justness of the uncivil obedient’s cause, may overcome any such qualms 
about her tactics. 
 223. By “public law values,” we mean to invoke values such as “openness, fairness, 
participation, impartiality, accountability, honesty and rationality” that are widely under-
stood to reinforce the rule of law and to reflect core goals of constitutional and adminis-
trative regulation. Michael Taggart, The Province of Administrative Law Determined?, in 
The Province of Administrative Law 1, 3 (Michael Taggart ed., 1997). 
 224. See supra Parts III.A–B (examining possible legal responses to uncivil 
obedience). 
 225. Cf. supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text (discussing relationship between 
communicativeness and candor in practice of uncivil obedience). 
 226. See supra Part II.B.3 (explaining direct–indirect distinction). 
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umented aliens who protested the prohibition on their working by not 
working; the young Teddy Roosevelt who protested the Sunday-saloon-
closure law by closing all saloons open on Sundays—in each of these 
examples, the uncivil obedients did not fear reconsideration of the laws 
they were exploiting, for this was exactly the type of legal change they 
were seeking. Direct uncivil obedience has “all the simplicity” of attack-
ing the very law to which it adheres.227 The protest performs its own 
critique. 
The more prevalent, indirect version of uncivil obedience is not 
“simple” in this way; it has no such built-in guarantor of intelligibility. 
Employees who work to rule will not necessarily acknowledge the sense in 
which they are defying their employers’ wishes. State legislators who 
regulate abortion clinics or procedures will not necessarily acknowledge 
their desire to limit access to abortion. A measure of opacity may better 
serve the reformist project. By attending so conspicuously to the letter of 
the law, uncivil obedience can obscure its own novelty and normativity—a 
sleight of hand that civil disobedience can never perform. For those who 
prize honesty and transparency in the utilization of law, then, the indirect 
variant of uncivil obedience ought to elicit particular worries. 
These worries, in turn, contribute to a broader set of concerns about 
values such as accountability, deliberation, civic virtue, and the constrain-
ing function of law, insofar as those values depend upon honesty or 
transparency for their realization.228 A loose analogy might be drawn to 
what David Dyzenhaus calls grey holes, or situations where “there are 
some legal constraints . . . but the constraints are so insubstantial that 
they pretty well permit [an actor] to do as it pleases.”229 A black hole, in 
contrast, does not even pretend to constrain. It is “a lawless void.”230 Like 
a grey hole, uncivil obedience may allow those who use it to have their 
“cake and eat it too”—to give the appearance of constraint while in fact 
exercising extraordinary discretion, using the “cloak” of formal legality 
to neutralize critique.231 
Dyzenhaus argues that grey holes may be more corrosive than black 
holes to the rule of law, understood in substantive or “thick” terms, 
because while black holes provoke consternation when perceived, grey 
holes breed quiescence.232 The dearth of critical commentary on uncivil 
                                                                                                                           
 227. Baker, supra note 83, at 30. 
 228. See, e.g., Adam Shinar, Dissenting from Within: Why and How Public Officials 
Resist the Law, 40 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 601, 650 (2013) (“Overt resistance is likely to be better 
than covert resistance at promoting dialogue and debate . . . .”). 
 229. David Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency 42 
(2006). Dyzenhaus expressly ties his idea of grey holes to executive officials, but the 
central insights can be generalized to other actors. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at 42, 50. 
 232. See, e.g., David Dyzenhaus, Schmitt v. Dicey: Are States of Emergency Inside or 
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obedience, as compared to the regular hand-wringing over civil disobe-
dience, mirrors this asymmetry. Civil disobedience presents as lawless and 
therefore invites rather than evades correction. 
Civil disobedience also demands personal sacrifice. The civil disobe-
dient commits an open breach of law and thereby courts punishment by 
the state; on many accounts, she goes further and willingly submits to 
that punishment.233 The sincerity and strength of conviction needed to 
motivate such behavior will generally be substantial. Uncivil obedience 
involves a relatively minimal risk of formal sanction. This risk cannot be 
eliminated, as explained above,234 and in certain settings informal sanc-
tions may provide a meaningful substitute.235 But the uncivil obedient will 
not expect prosecution, imprisonment, or the like, and she may well 
anticipate no negative repercussions whatever. The comparative cheap-
ness of uncivil obedience lowers the likelihood that it will be undertaken 
only after conventional means of persuasion have been exhausted. Along 
with uncivil obedience’s capacity to conceal aspects of its agenda, this 
feature exerts downward pressure on the conscientiousness criterion, if 
not on civic virtue more broadly.236 
Civil disobedience, as explained in Part I, paradoxically expresses 
fidelity to the legal system as a whole even as it violates a certain legal 
norm. Uncivil obedience paradoxically expresses insolence toward law 
even as it conforms to all formal requirements. The practice of uncivil 
obedience not only frustrates some of law’s substantive goals but also 
denies its claim to moral authority, mocks its aspiration to guide behavior 
in a principled fashion. If one common anxiety about civil disobedience 
is that overt law-breaking may breed disrespect for the law as such,237 
uncivil obedience pushes us to ask about the externalities of extreme law-
following. By showcasing the manipulation of legal rules for unintended 
                                                                                                                           
Outside the Legal Order?, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 2005, 2026 (2006) (arguing “grey holes are 
more harmful to the rule of law than [are] black holes” because only former mask their 
“lack of substance”). 
 233. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text (discussing these accounts of civil 
disobedience). 
 234. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text (noting possibility of finding of 
illegality, notwithstanding uncivil obedient’s genuine, well-founded belief in legality of her 
conduct). 
 235. See generally supra Part III.C (discussing informal regulation of uncivil 
obedience). 
 236. Cf. Brownlee, Communicative Aspects, supra note 11, at 181 (“[T]he legal 
protester will not be called upon by the law to defend her decision to protest. This means 
that whatever conscientious intentions underpin her protest need not meet the same stan-
dards as those that distinguish serious civil disobedients from ordinary offenders.”). 
 237. See, e.g., Brownlee, Civil Disobedience, supra note 6 (noting one harm “usually 
identified with civil disobedience” is that it “can encourage more than just other civil 
disobedience; it can encourage a general disrespect for the law”). 
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ends, uncivil obedience may breed disrespect for the project of self-
governance through law. 
Governmental uncivil obedience exacerbates the foregoing con-
cerns.238 It affects the regulatory process, and through it regulated sub-
jects, in a more immediate manner given its location within that process. 
Whereas private uncivil obedients typically must persuade a higher 
authority that the reforms they seek are worthwhile, their governmental 
counterparts may be able to effect legal change directly, without assum-
ing a similar burden of persuasion. And while private citizenship may de-
mand some amount of extralegal civic responsibility, government office-
holding, on almost any conception, demands a greater amount. The 
viability of democratic politics arguably depends on officials’ comporting 
themselves with a certain civility—a respect for principles of tradition, 
moderation, and cooperation that both fosters good governance and sets 
a salutary example for the community at large. Inasmuch as uncivil obe-
dience jeopardizes the efficacy or integrity of, say, the U.S. Senate, the 
health of the American polity, not just a particular institution, is at stake. 
Governmental uncivil obedience also affects deliberation and 
accountability in a distinctly troubling manner. To the extent that federal 
or state legislators have used the cloak of legal obedience to mask the full 
measure of their challenge to established authorities, they have not only 
engaged in a kind of parliamentary sabotage but also deprived citizens of 
a valuable input into public debate and the electoral mechanism. They 
have eroded the representative process. 
These points should not be overstated: As with all types of uncivil 
obedience, governmental uncivil obedience cannot be ruled out as a 
matter of principle and may be morally as well as legally justified under 
certain conditions. A great deal depends on context. It is important to be 
clear about the stakes, however. When public officials resort to legalistic 
dissent, the fear is not just abuse of right but abuse of power. 
B. Power 
Moral evaluations of civil disobedience often ask whether those 
involved could have achieved their aims through normal, lawful chan-
nels. Rawls, for instance, argues that civil disobedience should be used 
only as a “last resort,” when a “minority” group has already “appeal[ed] 
to the political majority” and found it to be immovable.239 As this lan-
guage suggests, civil disobedience is commonly associated with actors 
who lack social and governmental power, those who are liable to lose in 
the political process notwithstanding the intensity of their convictions. 
                                                                                                                           
 238. See supra Parts II.B.2, II.B.4 (describing uncivil obedience by government offi-
cials and institutions). 
 239. Rawls, supra note 6, at 373. 
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Our paradigm cases of civil disobedience involve minoritarian bids for 
the recognition of rights to equal treatment or basic liberties.240 
Any comprehensive normative assessment of uncivil obedience must 
grapple with its utilization by the powerless and powerful alike. Of partic-
ular note, we have suggested, is the fact that government agents and 
entities—society’s most democratically empowered actors—frequently 
engage in this form of legalistic dissent. The contrast with civil disobedi-
ence is stark. Whereas government service neither selects for nor rewards 
a taste for reform-minded law-breaking, uncivil obedience allows office-
holders to press dissenting positions from within the stance of legality 
that the public expects of them.241 They may do this as individuals (as in 
the case of Senate holds242) or as collectives (as in the case of state 
legislatures challenging abortion rights and the Affordable Care Act243). 
They may do it within a single branch of government, between branches 
or levels of government, or across national boundaries.244 
Attending to uncivil obedience therefore complicates the popular 
association of dissidence with private parties who lack public power.245 At 
the same time, other important examples of uncivil obedience conform 
closely to that model. We find criminal defendants and welfare recipients 
exercising their formal entitlements in unexpectedly maximalist ways, 
just as we find senators engaging in these behaviors. There are good 
reasons why uncivil obedience might appeal to the most vulnerable mem-
bers of a community. For those who cannot afford to lose a job or spend 
time in jail, the potential downsides of overt resistance, and especially 
overt law-breaking, may seem too severe. Because it operates through 
                                                                                                                           
 240. See Markovits, supra note 9, at 1899–901 (highlighting this feature of traditional 
civil disobedience and citing American civil rights movement as “most prominent” 
example); Brownlee, Civil Disobedience, supra note 6 (“The historical paradigms of 
Gandhi, King, the suffragettes, and Mandela are representative of that kind of civil dis-
obedience which aims to guarantee legal protection for the basic rights of a specific 
constituency.”). 
 241. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical 
Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1097, 1140 (2013) (noting “pervasive 
existence of public ‘law talk’” in United States, in which government officials “almost 
always endeavor[] to argue that [their] actions are lawful”). 
 242. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (noting role of “holds” in recent sen-
atorial uncivil obedience). 
 243. See supra Part II.B.4 (considering these examples). 
 244. Cf. supra notes 154–155 and accompanying text (describing related concept of 
abuse of right in international law). 
 245. Recent legal scholarship has complicated this association in other respects. See, 
e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1745 (2005) (arguing 
disaggregated institutions enable minorities to constitute local majorities and thereby 
dissent through governance decisions); Shinar, supra note 228 (exploring resistance by 
government officials to laws and policies they are responsible for implementing). 
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and within the law, uncivil obedience will in many cases offer a less risky 
form of protest.246 
To push the point further, uncivil obedience might be understood as 
a peculiarly legalistic variant of what anthropologist James Scott calls 
“critiques within the hegemony.”247 Across cultures, Scott demonstrates, 
exaggerated compliance with authoritative norms has long been a critical 
source of resistance for subordinate groups.248 Because it adopts the ideo-
logical terms of the dominant group, such resistance is difficult to punish 
and to deflect: “Having formulated the very terms of the argument and 
propagated them, the ruling stratum can hardly decline to defend itself 
on this terrain of its own choosing.”249 
A version of this tension characterizes uncivil obedience. In a society 
like the contemporary United States, committed in principle and in rhet-
oric to a norm of legality, meticulous adherence to the letter of the law 
presents an especially awkward problem, as it feigns obsequiousness to 
one of the ruling stratum’s most cherished ideals. Some of the least pow-
erful members of society may embrace this mode of protest precisely 
because it disrupts the status quo without disclosing the full measure of 
its subversiveness. 
If civil disobedience and uncivil obedience are each tools of resis-
tance for marginalized groups, however, they may serve largely distinct 
roles. Civil disobedience has proven a compelling strategy in campaigns 
for the recognition of what international lawyers call first-generation 
rights, basic “civil and political rights that typically take the form of neg-
ative protections against government action.”250 While there is nothing 
that precludes uncivil obedience from being enlisted for these ends, both 
its dependence on formal law and the examples we have collected 
suggest that uncivil obedience more readily lends itself to “second-
generation”251 struggles for social and economic gains: A layer of liberal 
                                                                                                                           
 246. See supra notes 233–236 and accompanying text (discussing limited liability that 
attends uncivil obedience). 
 247. James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance 105 (1990) [hereinafter 
Scott, Arts of Resistance]. 
 248. Id. at 103–07; see also, e.g., James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak 26 (1985) 
(suggesting in some cases “symbolic compliance” with despised norm may be maximized 
in order to minimize “actual” compliance). 
 249. Scott, Arts of Resistance, supra note 247, at 105; cf. Saul D. Alinsky, Rules for 
Radicals: A Practical Primer for Realistic Radicals 128 (1971) (“The fourth rule [of power 
tactics] is: Make the enemy live up to their own book of rules. You can kill them with this, for 
they can no more obey their own rules than the Christian church can live up to 
Christianity.”). 
 250. David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of Global 
Constitutionalism, 99 Calif. L. Rev. 1163, 1191 (2011). 
 251. We bracket here many complexities regarding the precise boundaries of, and 
relationships between, the “first-generation” and “second-generation” concepts. See, e.g., 
Philip Alston & Ryan Goodman, International Human Rights 285 (2012) (observing these 
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guarantees having been conferred and administrative regulations laid 
down, subordinate groups may then turn to provocative modes of com-
pliance or utilization to leverage such laws for more encompassing re-
forms. The Cloward–Piven plan and countless work-to-rule campaigns, 
for instance, have sought to leverage existing welfare-benefit and 
employee-protection laws to advance such groups’ actual material 
circumstances.252 
Insofar as uncivil obedience differs from the classic paradigm of civil 
disobedience in this respect, it might find more common ground with 
the phenomenon that Daniel Markovits calls “democratic disobedi-
ence.”253 Instead of seeking to protect liberal rights against the major-
itarian excesses of democracy, democratic disobedience seeks to improve 
democracy itself—understood in republican terms to demand robust 
political engagement and “a widespread sense of authorship of collective 
decisions”254—by overcoming the inertial forces “that prevent a dem-
ocratic sovereign from taking up an issue.”255 
Under the right conditions, ambitious projects of uncivil obedience 
could similarly trigger processes of “sovereign reengagement”256 with the 
issues that motivate them. The Cloward–Piven plan, for example, might 
be understood in these terms given its explicit—and at least partially 
realized—aim not to fend off an overreaching state but rather to stim-
ulate new lines of policy debate, new political coalitions, and a new pop-
ular consciousness around welfare poverty.257 Much more work would 
need to be done to confidently characterize, let alone justify, any partic-
ular act of uncivil obedience as democracy-enhancing in a republican (or 
any other) sense. The point here is simply that the same basic moves 
made by Markovits to reconceptualize certain forms of broadly framed, 
politically destabilizing disobedience as an ally rather than a threat to 
democracy could be deployed, mutatis mutandis, in defense of com-
parably ambitious forms of uncivil obedience. 
 
                                                                                                                           
“two sets of rights can neither logically nor practically be separated in watertight 
compartments”). 
 252. See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text (setting out these examples). 
 253. Markovits, supra note 9. Markovits’s essay, which was inspired by the antiglobal-
ization protests of the mid-2000s, presciently anticipated the Occupy Wall Street move-
ment. See, e.g., id. at 1950–52 (speculating about “growing prominence” of disobedience 
concerned more with democratic legitimacy and accountability than with liberal rights). 
 254. Id. at 1913. 
 255. Id. at 1940. More specifically, democratic disobedience, “when it is justified, pur-
sues processes rather than outcomes, employs coercion only in destabilizing ways, and 
serves momentary coalitions rather than entrenched constituencies.” Id. at 1944. 
 256. Id. at 1927, 1934–36, 1940–41, 1949. 
 257. See generally Piven & Cloward, Weight of the Poor, supra note 34 (suggesting 
each of these objectives). 
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C. Parties 
If uncivil obedience complicates the association of dissent with extra-
legal channels and with private actors who lack public power, so too may 
the phenomenon complicate its association with the political left.258 
Incorporating uncivil obedience into a richer typology of dissent would 
likely reveal that acts of protest are more evenly distributed across the 
political and ideological spectrum. 
Recent work in social psychology indicates that political conser-
vatives value deference to established authority, as such, more than polit-
ical liberals do.259 Whereas psychological foundations of fairness and care 
are paramount for self-identified liberals, Jonathan Haidt argues, “intui-
tions about authority and the importance of respect and obedience” 
critically inform the moral systems of self-identified conservatives.260 
Because dissent, generally, marks a challenge to authority, it is therefore 
unsurprising that dissent has been more strongly associated with liberals 
than with conservatives. And because civil disobedience is a particularly 
acute form of dissent, it is especially unsurprising that civil disobedience 
has this reputation.261 Civil disobedience pairs a dissenting message with 
                                                                                                                           
 258. See, e.g., Soc’y for Personality & Soc. Psychol., Are Conservatives More Obedient 
and Agreeable than Their Liberal Counterparts?, ScienceDaily (June 27, 2014), http:// 
www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2014/06/140627113048.htm (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (“Historically, conservatives are viewed as being more obedient and more 
respectful of leadership. Whereas, liberals tend to be associated with protests and blatant 
acts of rebellion.”). 
 259. See, e.g., Bob Altemeyer, The Authoritarian Specter 6–49 (1996) (reviewing 
evidence that “right-wing authoritarians,” who tend to be conservative, exhibit high de-
gree of submission to established authorities); George Lakoff, Moral Politics: How Liberals 
and Conservatives Think 65–140 (2d ed. 2002) (arguing conservatives have “strict father” 
morality while liberals have “nurturant parent” morality); Shalom H. Schwartz et al., Basic 
Personal Values, Core Political Values, and Voting: A Longitudinal Analysis, 31 Pol. 
Psychol. 421, 444–46 (2010) (finding people who endorse values of conformity and tradi-
tion tend to be conservative). 
 260. Jonathan Haidt, The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology, 316 Science 998, 1001 
(2007). According to Haidt: 
The current triggers of the Authority/subversion foundation . . . include any-
thing that is construed as an act of obedience, disobedience, respect, disrespect, 
submission, or rebellion, with regard to authorities perceived to be legit-
imate . . . . [I]t is much easier for the political right to build on this foundation 
than it is for the left, which often defines itself in part by its opposition to hier-
archy, inequality, and power. 
Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and 
Religion 168 (2013) [hereinafter Haidt, Righteous Mind]. 
 261. See, e.g., Katherine Beckett & Theodore Sasson, The Politics of Injustice 48 (2d 
ed. 2004) (“Conservatives [in the 1960s] identified the civil rights movement—and, in 
particular, the philosophy of civil disobedience—as a leading cause of crime.”); Wil Mara, 
Civil Unrest in the 1960s: Riots and Their Aftermath 47 (2010) (“[Conservatives] have 
little patience for those who practice civil disobedience. In their minds breaking the law is 
breaking the law . . . .”); Russell Hittinger, Resisting the Sovereign, 3 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 
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conduct—law-breaking—that is itself a provocative mode of dissent. 
Form and content alike challenge the extant legal order, making civil 
disobedience at best an uncomfortable practice for those who base their 
moral systems on foundations of respect for and obedience to authority. 
Uncivil obedience disconnects form from content. It cloaks dissent 
in behavior that is, at least superficially, respectful of established author-
ity. As we have explained, the uncivil obedient emphasizes the formal 
legality of her action. Like the civil disobedient, she is out to change the 
system, but she does so by mastering the system’s rules. She does so from 
the inside.262 That alone may render uncivil obedience a more comfort-
able practice for conservatives in light of the social-psychological evi-
dence noted above—perhaps all the more so if combined with a growing 
body of research finding that in the moral domain “people care a great 
deal more about appearance and reputation than about reality.”263 
The foregoing discussion suggests the following hypothesis: We may 
expect to witness a systematic skew in the distribution of conservative 
dissent in the direction of uncivil obedience and away from civil disobedi-
ence.264 And indeed, as Part II indicates, uncivil obedience has emerged 
in recent years at both the state and national levels as a leading strategy 
of Republican265 opposition to a Democratic Administration and, more 
                                                                                                                           
149, 156 (1998) (book review) (“[T]here is almost nothing favorable to be said about civil 
disobedience from conservative quarters . . . .”); see also Abigail A. Fuller, Conflict 
Resolution and Conservative Ideology: The Use of Civil Disobedience by Operation 
Rescue (Dec. 1990) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.colorado.edu/ 
conflict/full_text_search/AllCRCDocs/90-1.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
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see Lynn Robert Buzzard & Paula Campbell, Holy Disobedience: When Christians Must 
Resist the State 1–20 (1984) (offering examples of civil disobedience undertaken by 
conservatives). 
 262. Cf. Robert W. Gordon, The Past as Authority and as Social Critic: Stabilizing and 
Destabilizing Functions of History in Legal Argument, in The Historic Turn in the Human 
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Robert Kurzban, Mysteries of Morality, 112 Cognition 281 (2009) (discussing significance 
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An Evolutionary and Cognitive Perspective, 27 Mind & Language 495 (2012) (discussing 
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 264. This hypothesis may break down at the extreme right end of the ideological 
spectrum, where individuals are deeply alienated from the prevailing legal order and less 
likely to accept law’s claim to legitimate authority. 
 265. While much of the social-psychological literature on morality addresses liberals 
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broadly, to condemned laws and policies emanating from federal 
sources. Challenges to the legal availability of abortion, federal immigra-
tion policy, Obamacare, and Obama’s presidency itself have all assumed 
this hyper-legalistic form.266 
To be clear, this hypothesis does not imply that uncivil obedience is 
an exclusively or predominantly Republican tactic. Our examples show 
that Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives, engage in 
the practice. If uncivil obedience regarding Obamacare, abortion, and 
(perceived) immigration-law underenforcement bears a conserva-
tive/Republican stamp, uncivil obedience regarding welfare policy, crim-
inal justice, and (perceived) immigration-law overenforcement has 
aligned with a liberal/Democratic agenda.267 The point is not that uncivil 
obedience is a distinctively Republican practice, but rather that the 
Republican practice of dissent may in this era distinctively assume the 
form of uncivil obedience. 
CONCLUSION 
The subject of civil disobedience has inspired a remarkably rich 
body of work by legal and political theorists. The actual practice of civil 
disobedience, according to some of these same theorists, has become 
increasingly irrelevant.268 As guarantees of fundamental freedoms and 
equal treatment have been extended to more and more members of the 
world’s democracies, classic forms of civil disobedience that seek to vin-
dicate basic rights have lost some of their urgency.269 The whole liberal 
                                                                                                                           
liberals, and the overwhelming majority of House and Senate Republicans are conser-
vatives.”); Robert S. Erikson et al., Public Opinion in the States: A Quarter Century of 
Change and Stability, in Public Opinion in State Politics 229, 238 (Jeffrey E. Cohen ed., 
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 266. See supra Part II.B.4, notes 96–102 and accompanying text (exploring these 
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model of carefully circumscribed law-breaking may seem an awkward fit 
for many of the most pressing moral concerns of today.270 
Whatever the fate of civil disobedience, this Article has suggested 
that its legalistic doppelganger is alive and well—and an increasingly 
prominent element in American politics. Moreover, uncivil obedience 
may be thriving in part because of the very developments that have 
marginalized civil disobedience. Even as the proliferation of rights 
language in statutes, constitutions, and judicial decisions has limited 
opportunities for conscientious law-breaking in the service of basic liber-
ties, it has simultaneously expanded opportunities for disruptive modes 
of adherence and implementation. The denser and more detailed the 
law on the books, the more rules there will be for protesters to exploit in 
technically valid yet subversive ways. This Article is a first pass at 
investigating the phenomenon. Scholars, activists, and regulators alike 
will need to continue the study of uncivil obedience if they wish to reck-
on with the full possibilities and problems of dissent in the years to come. 
 
                                                                                                                           
 270. See id. at 1933–52 (developing this argument and citing protests against 
Vietnam War, nuclear weapons, and globalization as examples of issues not amenable to 
liberal disobedience); see also Brownlee, Civil Disobedience, supra note 6 (citing environ-
ment, animal rights, nuclear disarmament, globalization, and foreign policy as issues at 
fore of contemporary activist agenda that do not focus on individuals’ basic rights). 
